Mswati's first-world dream is a nightmare for the oppressed - says Communist Party of Swaziland

1.    Swaziland’s richest 20% of the population own and control practically all the country’s wealth

2.    Over 290,000 out of about 1 million people have HIV (26.5%); highest rate in the world. King Mswati wants all these people gone within seven years!

3.    Mswati’s bombastic first-world status pledge looks both ridiculous and cruel; a farce and a tragedy.

Below is the full statement of the Communist Party of Swaziland statement:

Communist Party of Swaziland: Mswati’s HIV-Aids idiocy highlights our bitter struggle

Swaziland’s absolute ruler, Mswati III, adds a grotesque twist to Marx’s observation that history repeats itself, first as tragedy and then as farce.

Mswati and his regime manage to combine both qualities in equal measure: the tragedy of autocracy imposing poverty, disease and degradation on an oppressed population; the farce of the bumbling Mswati’s vanity construction projects, deluded self-image of omnipotent divinity, grasping greed.

The latest demonstration of this tragi-comic narrative is Mswati’s declaration that he would “personally” eradicate HIV-Aids from Swaziland by 2022, a deadline he has already set for the country attaining ‘first world’ status.

Swaziland is now classified as a lower-middle income country, ranking 141 out of 187 on the Human Development Index.  The richest 20% of the population own and control practically all the country’s wealth.

The IMF – hardly a progressive social policy advocate – has long observed in its country reports on Swaziland that spending on the royal family drains the economy, and that there is a need for more social spending (health, education) to nurture the economy.

There are for now no high-income economies in Africa, by World Bank measurements, so Mswati’s bombastic first-world status pledge looks both ridiculous and cruel. Farce and tragedy.

Swaziland’s economic prospects are hampered by many things, but the main one in terms of our people’s capacity is the HIV-Aids pandemic. Some 26.5%, or about 290,000 of our population have the virus, the highest rate in the world.

But the 26.5% figure is an average for a total 1.1 million of our people. The prevalence of HIV-Aids among 19-24 year-olds in Swaziland was 40.8% in 2010.More than 80% of people with HIV-Aids also have TB.

Anti-retroviral treatment is reckoned to reach 85% with advanced HIV infection. But many thousands do not receive treatment at all.

And this 85% figure is too neat. It is the regime’s figure for how well it is doing. It doesn’t take into account zigzags in the availability of ARVs, the numbers of people who fatefully drop out of the treatment programme, the effects of inadequate counselling, the numbers who go to South Africa to receive treatment.

Mswati’s nonchalant pledge on eliminating HIV-Aids in our country over the next seven years is meaningless.

Last year, 2014, the regime pledged to cut mother-to-child-transmission, or PMTCT, of HIV by 95% by this year, 2015. This would have required a great acceleration of earlier ostensible PMTCT commitments and stands as an empty Mswati promise.

The same goes for his 2022 HIV-Aids eradication deadline. And here’s why.

One reason – the farce – is that Mswati either thinks that none of our people who have HIV-Aids will be alive after seven years, or that there will be a universal cure by that date and so everyone will be fine. Assuming that treatment is properly available, the hundred thousand or so people on ARV treatment will, we hope, still be with us after 2022, and they will still need treatment and care. Mswati’s cut-off date is as nonsensical as is his rich country-status fantasy.

The real reason – the tragedy – runs deeper.

We often think that channelling all of Mswati’s ill-gotten cash to public needs would solve our problems as a potential ‘developmental state’. But at most, this would restore some balance and fairness to the state budgeting and fiscal process. And it would unleash a steady flow of much needed moola into the treasury. But it would not solve all our problems, not least in combating HIV-Aids.

If all the money that was wasted on the monarchy, all the funds wrongly diverted to the bank accounts of the king, his wives and children, and his extended family; if all the revenue from land and resources held by the king “in trust for the Swazi nation”; if all the Swazi money held by the king in foreign tax havens and secret bank accounts – if all that was put where it belongs, into the Swazi economy under a system of democratic representation and accountability. Then at most we might be in a better position to take charge of most of the spending on anti-retroviral treatment (ART), which currently is some 60% dependent on foreign donors.

We might also be able to cut costs of treatment by opting for WHO-recommended first and second line combinations. Currently, treatment expenditure in Swaziland works out at about $509 per person per year for the roughly 110 000 people on ARVs. It should be much less, as little as $172 per person per year for first-line single pill combinations, and about $303 for second-line treatment.

According to Forbes, in 2008 Mswati was worth $200 million (now E2.3 billion). ARV treatment costs from national and international sources runs to about E6.2 billion ($56 million) a year.

Mswati’s savings would not cover this for long. But if we were to channel the E550 million ($50 million) Mswati counts as personal income, according to Forbes, and if we were to ensure that Swaziland followed the WHO recommendations on affordable treatment regimes, we would be able to severely dent treatment expenditure.  And this only concerns pharmaceutical treatment costs. It doesn’t touch on the costs of the rest of the work to tackle HIV-Aids, all of which needs overhauling and improving.

The point is that our HIV-Aids pandemic is a massive battle. It is one that demands vast resources and strategizing that will take years to enact so we can gradually reduce the incidence and burden of the disease. As the CPS, we do not trust the Mswati regime’s pledges of solving this or that facet of the crisis by any particular date.

We have seen the regime’s budgetary deceptions all too often in the past to trust that the information it provided – especially the statistics and projections – for the Swaziland Global Response Progress Reporting 2014 (UNAIDS).

The regime plays fast and loose with revenue and donated cash. We have every reason to doubt its rosy descriptions of what it is achieving in combating HIV-Aids. Our emergence from the pandemic requires emergency action geared to wholly scientific and candid approaches, and much of this is impossible as long as the autocracy remains in power.

Mswati’s asinine remarks on ending the pandemic in seven years comically unmask a hard reality that we are still very far from beating.

END

Issued by the  Communist Party of Swaziland

Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in exile – Swaziland

This is an excerpt from a document titled “Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in exile” taken from South African History Online. It examines in detail MK activities in a number of African countries, and briefly the international support from non-African countries. Reproduced herein is an excerpt focusing on Swaziland.

If anyone has more information on the subject, please assist.

Swaziland

Background

The relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) and Swaziland dates back to the formation of the SANNC in 1912. Swazi queen regent Labotsibeni and crown prince Sobhuza, who became King Sobhuza II in 1921, financed the Abantu Batho newspaper, a mouthpiece of the SANNC. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Swazis were involved in ICU and ANC activities, particularly in the Transvaal.  For instance, Richard W Msimang, who grew up in Swaziland, and Benjamin Nxumalo, a relative of King Sobhuza II, were involved with the South African Native National Congress (SANNC)  later renamed the ANC. Nxumalo served as Swaziland's representative on the committee that wrote the SANNC (later ANC) constitution of 1919. He later formed a Swaziland branch of the ANC in Sobhuza’s house in Sophiatown.

From the early 1900s there were moves to incorporate Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana (the three British Protectorates) into South Africa. When South Africa imposed apartheid and pulled out of the Commonwealth in 1961, the idea of incorporation was abandoned. Swaziland was briefly granted limited self-rule by the British government before the passing of the Swaziland Independence Act in 1968. After this, on 6 September 1968 Swaziland became an independent country with a constitutional monarchy under King Sobhuza II. The strategic location of Swaziland in relation to South Africa, particularly Natal, and its proximity to Johannesburg and Pretoria, made Swaziland a haven for members of South African liberation movements facing violent repression in their country. Significantly, in late 1968 the South African government amended the South African Police Act to allow members of the police force to operate in other countries, and government spies and informants began operating in Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and other countries.

The Establishment of MK in Swaziland

Thula Simpson, whose work focused on the ANC in Swaziland between 1960 and 1979, notes that South African refugees began arriving in Swaziland in significant numbers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This development was due to increasing repression in South Africa as the apartheid government began to pass and vigorously enforce repressive legislation. By the mid-1960s there were a number of ANC and MK activists in Swaziland. By the time Stanley Mabizela arrived in Swaziland in 1965, Joseph Nduli, Ablon ‘Bafana’ Duma and Albert Dhlomo were already based there. Their task was to develop underground structures of MK cells by recruiting South African refugees in Swaziland. They worked with people inside South Africa, particularly in Natal, to facilitate movement across the two countries for MK assignments. Recruitment was not an easy task as some of the people were not politically active, enjoying a relatively comfortable life as middle class income earners – British policy sought to incorporate refugees into Swazi society by allowing them to work and settle there.

In the period around 1974 and 1975 the ANC embarked on a process to rebuild its structures in Swaziland. In December 1974, Thabo Mbeki and Maxwell Sisulu arrived in Swaziland and were tasked with improving relations with the Swazi monarchy and recruiting refugees for the movement. At a meeting in September 1975 the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki and Oliver Tambo met with King Sobhuza II. Later, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng and Martin Ramokgadi also spent time in Swaziland to establish an MK military network. Zuma was involved particularly in forging links between Natal and Swaziland, while Nkadimeng and Ramokgadi worked on links to the Transvaal. Safe-houses for MK recruits in transit were also established in various areas of Manzini.

When Mozambique gained independence in 1975 the number of MK cadres passing through Swaziland to Mozambique and then to other countries increased. Swaziland was used as transit point for MK recruits on their way to military training in other African countries, and in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1977 the ANC used properties in Ngwane Park in Manzini, Swaziland, to assist with the processing of refugees who wanted to join its ranks.  At these recruitment centres, potential recruits were instructed to write their biographies, state the reasons why they wanted to join the ANC, and describe how they ended up in Swaziland. They were then taken to Maputo, where they were vetted by the ANC’s security apparatus.

King Sobhuza II was initially sympathetic to the ANC and generally turned a blind eye to its activities, but as MK began using Swaziland as a transit point for weapons headed for South Africa, there was a change of attitude. A number of raids were conducted by the Swazis, resulting in the confiscation of ANC weapons in transit.  According to Simpson, serious problems arose when two groups of recruits reported to the Swazi police who in turn informed the South African government.

The information provided resulted in the capture of Samson Lukhele, “a taxi operator who worked for the ANC as a courier shuttling letters, money and recruits between Natal and Swaziland”. It was the information supplied by Lukhele that led to the arrest on 18 March 1976 of Joseph Mdluli, a key figure in the ANC underground in the Durban area. That same month two other people, Joseph “Mpisi” Nduli and Cleophas Ndlovu were kidnapped by South African security forces near the Swaziland border in a  trap set by the latter and Lukhele under the pretext of bringing recruits. Furthermore, Dhlomo, Mbeki and Zuma were arrested by the Swazi police and detained at Mbabane maximum security prison. They were nearly deported to South Africa, but Stanley Mabizela, Moses Mabhida and Thomas Nkobi managed to secure their release. They were subsequently deported to Mozambique.

On 17 February 1982 King Sobhuza II signed a secret agreement with South Africa. The pact bound both parties not to allow “any act which involves a threat or use of force against each other’s territory” and called for “action individually or collectively as may be deemed necessary or expedient to eliminate this evil”. After the agreement was signed, Stanley Mabizela, the ANC’s representative in Swaziland, was forced to leave the country. The death of King Sobhuza II in August 1982 worsened the position of the ANC in Swaziland as the country terminated the historical and sentimental connections between the Swazi monarchy and the ANC. The signing of the agreement was taken as a licence by Pretoria to deal with ANC activists in Swaziland in any way they wanted. In addition, the Swaziland security establishment mounted a sustained propaganda campaign and arrested many activists, particularly in the 1980s.

MK Missions launched from Swaziland

Elias Mabizela points out that the gunning down of Detective Sergeant Chapi Hlubi, a notorious police officer in Soweto, in January 1978, marked the beginning of an escalation of MK attacks inside South Africa. Hlubi was fingered as one of the black policeman who opened fire on protesting students in the 1976 uprising. In commemoration of Isandlwana, 1979 was declared the ‘Year of the Spear’ by the ANC, and 1980 was declared the ‘Year of the Charter’ to mark 25 years of the Freedom Charter. Both years were geared towards building morale for increased ANC activity inside South Africa, with Swaziland playing an important role as a transit point for MK cadres moving in and out of South Africa. Cadres were infiltrated into the Transvaal via the Jeppe’s Reef and the Oshoek border posts. MK used the Golela and Pongola border posts to link up with Natal underground machinery.

In 1980, MK carried out a sabotage attack on the Sasol 1 plant. They also attacked the Voortrekker military base in 1981, the Tonga outpost in 1982, and set off bombs in Hectorspruit in 1982 and Pretoria in 1983. All these were launched by MK operatives using Swaziland either as a base or a transit point.

Perhaps one of the most important areas from which MK launched operations was Ingwavuma in KwaZulu Natal, a town located less than five kilometres from the border with Swaziland. MK cadres, particularly those based in Natal, used the town as a transit point for guerrillas infiltrating into South Africa from Swaziland and Mozambique. Once in town, they stayed underground in safe-houses to avoid detection. Among those who played an important role in using the town was Jameson Nongolozi Mngomezulu, an active ANC and MK member born in Ingwavuma. After joining MK, he was deployed in Swaziland as a base commander and became central in facilitating the movement of cadres between Swaziland and Natal. When threats to his life escalated he fled to Swaziland.

Mngomezulu’s sister, Nokuhamba Nyawo, was also an important player. After being recruited to MK she gathered intelligence and provided supplies to MK operatives moving through the area. Nyawo would receive guerrillas passing through the area and help them skip the border into Swazi­land. As Jacob Zuma noted: ‘Through her efforts and those of many people from Ingwavuma, the MK secured a very strategic base and point of entry into the country, easily accessible from both Mozambique and Swaziland.’ Weapon consignments destined for MK in Natal regularly passed through the area, especially in the 1980s.

Jabulani Nobleman Nxumalo was deployed to Swaziland in 1983, disguised as a reporter for the Swaziland Observer under the pseudonym of Jabulani Dlamini. He was detained by the Swazi police and forced to leave the country in 1983, but he returned to Swaziland in December of the same year under a new pseudonym, this time setting in the Shiselweni district in the south of the country. It was from here that Nxumalo crossed the border into KwaZulu-Natal, setting up an MK unit based in Ingwavuma. He served as a commissar for MK based in rural Natal, a move important for the establishment of Operation Vulindlela. In 1984, Nxumalo was once again arrested by the Swazi police and deported to Tanzania. Increased MK military activity in the Ingwavuma area was linked to Operation Ingwavuma, a move by the ANC to establish military bases in the area and politicise the rural population to create a fertile and safe ground for MK missions.

Operation Ingwavuma

Operation Ingwavuma was conceived and implemented in 1984 by the Natal Regional Command of MK, in conjunction with its substructure known as the Northern Natal Military Command (NNMC). A political commissar was appointed, his job being to work as deputy commander liaising with the chief of staff, chief of intelligence and chief of logistics. Among the leading figures mapping out the operation was Zwelibanzi Nyanda.

The initial phase involved doing groundwork for the creation of guerrilla operational areas in Northern Natal by first politicising the local population. Other preparations included mapping out the terrain, recruiting people and establishing training bases. It was envisaged that recruits would establish mass peasant political organisations and underground units that would be assisted by MK military structures. Trained MK guerrillas were to constitute the core of the structure.

The area of Ingwavuma was chosen because of its strategic importance, as it is situated on the most Northern tip of Natal which borders Swaziland and Mozambique. MK and ANC operatives in Swaziland were a vital link between the movement and the local population. MK sought to take advantage of simmering anti-government discontent among the local population, who were unhappy that the government planned to cede the area of Ingwavuma and the KwaNgwane bantustan to Swaziland. Some of those who opposed the move became sympathetic to MK and joined the organization to undergo military training. Based on this development, MK concluded that it was possible to start a People's War at Ingwavuma.

A two-man reconnaissance team sent to the area for two weeks returned with a negative report about the possibility of establishing bases. Another team, however, compiled a report that encouraged the establishment of bases. Subsequently, two units were established, one named Nozishada and the other Maqendindaba. Both units trained several people from the local population. One MK recruit from the area was captured by the police and leaked information about the existence of MK bases in the area. South African security forces arrived to gather more information and later the KwaZulu police combed the area. One of the comrades, known as Post (possibly Linda Khuzwayo), went to the village and found that the Maqendindaba base was surrounded by SADF troops. He fired his pistol to warn four members of the unit, who escaped through a secret route, but Post was shot and killed. Others were arrested and sentenced to prison terms on Robben Island.  Operation Ingwavuma thus proved to be a failure to establish an MK guerrilla force on the ground strong enough to ignite a people’s war.

Response by the South African government

The government responded to the presence of MK in Swaziland by bombing safe-houses, abducting and turning ANC activists into askaris or murdering those who refused to cooperate, and assassinations. Their activities received support from the Swaziland police, who stepped up patrols along the border with South Africa to prevent crossing by the activists.  In addition to cooperation from Swaziland, South Africa used Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) operatives to carry out its work. The South African government also continued to pile pressure on the Swazi government to deal with ANC and MK, particularly after the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique – this because some MK operatives fled to Swaziland from Mozambique.

Abductions, Arrests and Detentions

One of the methods used by the South African government to neutralise MK operatives in Swaziland was abduction. The security branch in Port Natal played a critical role in the abduction, detention and murder of political activists and MK operatives who worked between Swaziland and Natal. Abductions began in the 1960s, but increased in the 1970s and 80s. Simpson notes that ‘the first refugee abducted from Swaziland was Rosemary Ann Wentzel – a Liberal Party member involved in underground work for the African Resistance Movement (ARM) … on 11 August 1964’.

Joseph Nduli and Cleophas Ndlovu, two MK operatives who carried out ANC underground work in the Greater Durban area, were kidnapped by South African security forces near the Swaziland border in mid-March 1976. Together with Ndlovu, Nduli recruited and facilitated the movement of MK recruits into Swaziland on their way to military training. The pair were taken to Island Rock near Sodwana, where they were interrogated. Ndlovu was assaulted, blindfolded, cuffed and had a rope put round his neck while tied to a tree. The pair were later tried alongside Harry Gwala and nine others in Pietermaritzburg from August 1976 to July 1977. The surgeon, Mr R Denyssen le Roux, filed an affidavit which noted scars on Nduli's forehead, the back of his head, neck, forearms and legs, pointing to signs of torture.

In February 1981 Dhayiah Joe Pillay, a South African refugee working as a teacher at St Joseph’s mission near Manzini, was kidnapped. One of his captors dropped a passport, leading to the arrest of some of Pillay’s kidnappers, who turned out to be members of RENAMO. The South African government intervened and asked the prosecutor not to oppose bail. This resulted in the release of Pillay’s captors and their disappearance. Pillay was released on 10 March 1981.

In December 1982 several ANC activists in Swaziland were rounded up and expelled to Mozambique.

In April 1984, Gaboutwelwe Christopher Mosiane, Vikelisizwe Colin Khumalo, Michael Dauwanga Matikinca, Ernest Nonjawangu and Glorius ‘Glory’ Lefoshie Sedibe (commonly known as the ‘Bhunya Four’) were abducted from Swaziland.

On 15 December 1986 South African security forces kidnapped Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Mandla Maseko and Simon Dladla in Swaziland and brought them to stand trial in South Africa. They were all tried and convicted; Ebrahim received a 20-year sentence, while Maseko and Dladla were sentenced to 23 and 12 years respectively.

Assassinations

On 4 June 1980 Patrick Makau, a member of MK; seven-year-old Patrick Nkosi, the son of an active ANC member; and Mawick Nkosi were killed in two separate bomb blasts in houses in Manzini. The attack came in response to an MK attack on the Sasol oil refinery in Secunda. The operation was ordered by Colonel JJ Viktor and Dirk Coetzee and the head of the Security Branch in Ermelo.

On 8 December 1981 two ANC men were ambushed close to the border and killed in their vehicle.

On 4 June 1982 Petrus Nzima Nyawose, the deputy ANC Representative in Swaziland, and his wife Jabu were killed in a car bomb planted by members of the security branch. In December 1983, a flat was raided in Manzini where ANC member Zwelakhe Nyanda and a Swazi national were killed.

In December 1981 members of the Special Task Force, a branch of the South African Police and Security Branch, killed two MK members in Swaziland to avenge the attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte Military Base on 12 August 1981.

After investigating and interrogating a person known only as Molefe, the detainee implicated Mnisi, a member of MK who under interrogation revealed information about MK operations inside the country, and its base in Swaziland. Mnisi was turned into an askari and ordered to lure MK operative George to meet him at the Swaziland border, where would be arrested. Mnisi and other members of the police proceeded to the Oshoek border post on the Swaziland border. Members of the task-force crossed the border and took up positions near the agreed meeting. George’s vehicle stopped some distance from the meeting point, throwing the operation into jeopardy. But when George’s car moved within range, members of Special Task Force fired, killing George and his MK comrade Brown.

In 1983 Brigadier Schoon ordered the elimination of Zwelibanzi Nyanda, a commander of MK units operating in Swaziland. Accompanied by Captain Eugene de Kock, among other security policemen, Jan Hattingh Cronje crossed into Swaziland and stayed at a hotel in Mbabane, where they prepared for the operation. At night, they raided the house where Nyanda and lived with another MK member, Keith MacFadden. Both were killed, while the informer who had disclosed their address was allowed to escape.

In June 1985 South African policemen and a member of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) crossed into Swaziland and kidnapped Jameson Nongolozi Mngomezulu and two other people. He was taken to Moolman, just outside Piet Retief in KwaZulu-Natal, before being moved to Leeuwspoor, a farm close to Jozini which was the headquarters of the northern Natal security police. After being severely tortured he lapsed into a coma and died. The security police then destroyed his body by blowing it up at a missile range near Sodwana Bay.

A year later, in June 1986, Jabulani Sydney Msibi, an MK operative who also served as the bodyguard of ANC president Oliver Tambo, was kidnapped in Swaziland on instructions from the Security Branch. He was brought to South Africa and taken to Daisy Farm, where he was assaulted and tortured. When efforts by the security branch failed to turn him into an askari, he was killed.

On 14 August 1986, two MK operatives, Jeremiah Timola and Mmbengeni Kone, were killed by members of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch while they were on their way to South Africa.

The following year, in June 1988, Nontsikelelo ‘Ntsiki’ Cotoza, a young member of MK, was killed in an ambush on the Swaziland border.

Ms Phila Portia Ndwandwe, an acting commander of MK who operated from Swaziland, was also killed in 1988. She facilitated the infiltration of ANC cadres into Natal before she was abducted by members of the Durban Security Branch. After capture, she refused to cooperate with the police and they did not have enough evidence to prosecute her. Instead of releasing her, the police executed her and buried her on the Elandskop farm outside Pietermaritzburg in October 1988.

In July 1988, Emmanuel Mthokizisi Mbova Mzimela, an MK member was abducted in Swaziland by the members of the security branch in Durban. When he refused to cooperate with the police by becoming their askari, he was executed and buried on a farm in the Elandskop area.

In May 1987, Theophilus ‘Viva’ Dlodlo, an MK operative, was killed after he was ambushed while in his car in Swaziland. At the time of his death he had been married for five months and had a just had a son.

On 9 July 1987 Job Tabane (alias Cassius Maake), who was the youngest member of the ANC National Executive Committee, and Sello Motau were killed in Swaziland after Motau picked up Tabane from the airport in Mbabane and their vehicle was forced off the road between Matsapa and Mbabane.

Conclusion

After his release from prison, Nelson Mandela visited Swaziland in November 1990 and met with some exiles still in the country. With the collapse of apartheid, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up to examine human rights violations that occurred under the apartheid. During this process the ANC submitted a list of 52 MK operatives killed by the apartheid security forces in Swaziland. However, the amnesty committee only received applications for 14 of the targeted killings. The number of MK operatives killed on the Swaziland-South Africa borders is higher compared to other countries that shared a border with South Africa. This underlines the strategic importance of Swaziland to MK in the struggle against apartheid.

Names of those killed in Swaziland or abducted from Swaziland and killed in SA

• Jameson Nongolozi Mngomezulu
• Victor M Mgadi
• Jeremiah Timola
• Mmbengeni Kone
• Zwelibanzi Nyanda
• Titus Dladla
• Thuluso A Matima
• MK George
• MK Brown
• Patrick Makau
• Mzwandile Radebe
• Oupa Funani
• Emmanuel Mthokizisi Mbova Mzimela
• Nontsikelelo “Ntsiki” Cotoza
• Portia Ndwandwe
• Theophilus ‘Viva’ Dlodlo
• Job Tabane ( alias Cassius Make)
• Sello Motau
• Keith MacFadden
• Petrus Nzima Nyawose

* The above is not a complete list, but it lists those covered in the narrative.

SWAZILAND: HOW SWAZI KING DESTROYED IRON MINE*

Reported by Swazi Media Commentary

Swaziland’s absolute monarch King Mswati III and his personal representative Sihle Dlamini were at the very heart of events that led to the collapse of the mining company SG Iron at the Ngwenya Iron Ore Mine. It had debts of US$4 million when it closed and more than 700 jobs were lost. King Mswati took a US$10 million loan from the company less than six months after it started trading which he refused to pay back when it hit difficulties. 

A compensation claim for at least US$141 million has been prepared by Southern Africa Resources Ltd (SARL), against the Kingdom of Swaziland at the International Centre for Settlement of INVESTMENT Disputes (ICSID).

SARL held a 50 percent stake in SG Iron Ore Mining (PTY) Ltd (SG Iron), which had formerly been known as Salgaocar Swaziland (PTY) Ltd. The Swaziland Government held 25 percent of the shares and the King personally held 25 percent ‘in trust for the nation.’ 

The mine was forced to cease trading in August 2014 after a series of events orchestrated by Sihle Dlamini, who is Director Administration at the King’s Office and Assistant Private Secretary to the King. He was also the King’s personal representative on the SG Iron board of directors.

Here is a step by step guide to what happened.

30 September 2010

SG Iron Ore Mining (PTY) Ltd. (when it was still called Salgaocar Swaziland (PTY) Ltd), was registered in accordance with the laws of Swaziland on 30 September 2010 under Certificate of Incorporation No.1196, with its principal business of operations at the Old Ngwenya Mine, Ngwenya, in the Hhohho district of Swaziland.

SG Iron’s stated goal was to reprocess iron ore dumps left over by the Anglo American Mining Company in the late 1970’s, when it ceased mining operations in the area, and to secure the main mine lease for 30 years once the iron ore dumps had been cleared. 

Due to advancements in technology, it had become scientifically possible to process the dumps and upgrade them into sellable grade ore. This project would create new jobs in Swaziland, while creating a new source of wealth for Swaziland, as well as clearing Swaziland of the dumps left by the Anglo American Mining Corporation and restarting mining activities.

30 June 2011

King Mswati, who as absolute monarch in Swaziland has sole control over mining rights in the kingdom, granted SG Iron a Mining Lease for seven years. The company agreed to pay the King ‘in trust for the Swazi Nation’ a royalty of 3 percent. It also gave the King 25 percent of the total company issued share capital at no cost. It also gave a further 25 percent of the issued share capital to the Swaziland Government, again at no cost. The remaining 50 percent of issued share capital went to SARL.

The King holds shares ‘in trust for the Swazi Nation’, but it iswidely reported outside of Swaziland that in fact he has received millions of dollars from international companies such as phone giant MTN; sugar conglomerates Illovo and Remgro; Sun International hotels and beverages firm SAB Millerto, which he spends on himself and his family. 

The King, who rules over an impoverished kingdom of only 1.4 million people, has 13 palaces, a fleet of top-of-the range BMS and Mercedes cars and a private jet airplane. Meanwhile, seven in ten of his subjects exist on incomes of less than US$2 per day.

As a general undertaking, the Mining Lease provided that each party should ‘act in such manner as shall be necessary in order to give effect to [the] Mining lease’. That mean they should all have worked to make sure the company was a success. 

It was agreed SARL, being the 50 percent shareholder of SG Iron, had management control of SG Iron, which was in charge of, and responsible for, day-to-day running of SG Iron. SARL was to provide all financial support and technical expertise necessary for SG IRON to succeed.

Article 6.8 of the Mining Lease provided that the Chairman in addition to having his own vote on the Board of Directors should have a casting vote. Shanmuga Rethenam was appointed as the Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors of SG Iron, and Sivarama Petla was appointed as its Chief Executive Officer. Both Executive Chairman and CEO were nominee and representatives of SARL.

Mbuso Dlamini was appointed as the Director for and on behalf of the Swaziland Government and Sihle Dlamini was appointed as the Director for and on behalf of the King.

SG Iron put up approximately US$50 million to start the mining operations and added further capital. The King and the Swaziland Government made no financial contributions.

21 October 2011

The official inauguration of operations was on 21 October 2011 with the dispatch of ore to Maputo Port in Mozambique. On 21 December 2011, the first shipment was carried out from Maputo Port and on 9 March 2012, a rail services from Mpaka to Maputo Port, Mozambique, started.

16 April 2012

Less than six months after operations began, King Mswati, through his representative Sihle Dlamini, asked for and received an advanced payment / loan of US$10 million on the King’s future dividend. This was at a meeting of the Board of Directors of Salgaocar Swaziland held in Mbabane, Swaziland, on 16 April 2012. The money was to be repaid from future dividends payable to the King. 

There was no public announcement made that the King received the money which he held ‘in trust for the nation’ and it is not known how he spent it. This later fuelled speculation that he had used the money to fund his own personal lavish lifestyle. 

26 April 2012

Reports began to appear on the Internet and later in newspapers in Swaziland that King Mswati had taken delivery of a privateDouglas DC-9 jet and that it had been given to him as a gift bySalgaocar. 

The company refused to confirm or deny the gift. The Swazi Government was lukewarm in its denial. The Times of Swaziland reported, ‘Dismissing the rumours, government Press Secretary Percy Simelane said “That is pure speculation.  The donor has asked to remain anonymous and it will be like that.”’  

Barnabas Dlamini, the Swazi Prime Minister, claimed to the media that the jet had been donated by ‘development partners’ of Swaziland.  

21August 2014

Sihle Dlamini, representing the King at SG Iron wrote to the CEO of SG Iron, Sivarama Petla, instructing him not to sell any more cargo on 21 August 2014. He did this without consulting the major shareholder, SARL. Since that day all attempts by SG Iron to sell cargo were blocked.

Contrary to the terms of the Mining Lease, the Board of Directors was not consulted about the decision to stop sales of iron ore. The Chairman, who was to chair all board meetings under Article 6.7 of the Mining Lease, and who also possessed a right of veto, was not even informed of the King’s decision.

In October 2014, in a founding affidavit at the Swaziland High Court to have the company placed under Judicial Management, Sihle Dlamini would state that a shareholders dispute at SARL in Singapore had made it impossible for management decisions to be taken at SG Iron. He also stated that the fall in the world price of iron ore had made production at the mine uneconomical.

After 21 August 2014

Blocking the sale of iron ore meant no trade could take place and SG Iron’s operations were brought to an abrupt standstill. Since no money was coming into the company from the sale of cargoes there was a cash-flow crisis. 

Sales could have resumed at any time because more than 100,000 tonnes of iron ore remained at Maputo Port, Mpaka Railway Siding and at the Mine Stockyard. In his High Court affidavit in October 2014, Sihle Dlamini revealed he had given instructions for ore to be stockpiled until the price of iron ore recovered.

SARL also requested that the King repay the full or part of the US$10 million loan / advance dividend to allow SG Iron to continue operating. The King refused to do this, instead the King’s representative Sihle Dlamini demanded that SARL inject more capital into the business, something it would not do while shipment of cargoes remained blocked.

SARL would say in January 2015 that it felt it had been held hostage by the King’s representative’s decision to unilaterally stop all shipments of cargo.

22 September 2014

At a board meeting of SG Iron held in Mbanane, Sihle Dlamini representing the King and Mbuso Dlamini, representing the Swazi Government, expressed dissatisfaction at the status of the company, saying that a shareholder dispute at SARL was impacting on SG Iron, something which was disputed by SG Iron.

The two men gave an ultimatum that fresh funds should be injected into the project no later than 26 September 2014. The Chairman of SG Iron, appointed by SARL, was present at this board meeting, and he requested that management allow the sale of the cargo, which would release sufficient funds to keep the company operating.

SARL again requested that the King should, ‘for the good of the company’s workers, its shareholders and the kingdom of Swaziland’, repay the full or part of the US$10 million loan / advance dividend to allow the continued operation of SG Iron. Sihle Dlamini, the King’s representative, refused.

Subsequent to the meeting, Sihle Dlamini, representing the King, asked SARL to wipe out the US$10 million loan.

29 September 2014

In a letter dated 29 September 2014, SARL refused to write off the King’s debt. SARL said in January 2015 that in response to this, Sihle Dlamini took a unilateral decision to stop operations and place the company into Judicial Management and then liquidation. This decision was taken without discussions with the major shareholder or considering the voting rights in place at SG Iron.

3 October 2014

Sihle Dlamini representing the King and Mbuso Dlamini, representing the Swaziland Government, called for a meeting of the Board of Directors and despite being told by the Chairman of the Board Shanmuga Rethenam that he could not attend, they went ahead with the meeting without him.

This was the first Board Meeting that had been held without the Chairman’s presence in the history of SG Iron. Sihle Dlamini, the King’s representative, served as the Chairman of the meeting, although he represented only 25 percent of the company’s share capital and SARL, the 50 percent shareholder, was supposed to have control of the board.

Sihle Dlamini and Mbuso Dlamani both resolved to place SG Iron under Judicial Management, without seeking the Chairman’s consent, rather than permitting operations and cargo sale to continue.

10 October 2014

SG Iron was placed under provisional Judicial Management by an Order of the High Court of Swaziland dated 10 October 2014. This order was based on the founding affidavit of Sihle Dlamini, the King’s representative. The Judicial Manager was able to immediately take control and assess the affairs, assets and liabilities of SG Iron.

In his statement, Dlamini said the company, ‘commenced operations on the 21^st of October 2011 and it has been extremely successful to date and has been a major income earner for the Kingdom of Swaziland.

‘[It] has also provided a number of investment opportunities to local transport contractors, construction companies and heavy plant and machinery contractors who carry out the bulk of its mining operations at Ngwenya.’

He added the company, ‘is not in an insolvent position in that its assets exceed its liabilities’. He said, however, the Board of Directors had ‘become hamstrung’ and was unable to take effective decisions on the operations of the company.

He said, ‘During or about December 2013, a serious shareholder dispute arose between the shareholders of the investor SARL, which dispute has resulted in arbitration proceedings being instituted between themselves in Singapore.’

He said he was not, ‘fully apprised of the nature of the dispute’, but nonetheless believed it meant that SARL representatives on the Board of SG Iron were unable to take decisions.

Sihle Dlamini also said that the falling price of iron ore had impacted the company. He said the price fell from E1,360 (about US$136) per tonne in January / February 2014 to E550 (US$55) per tonne. This was a new six-year low of the price of iron ore. 

‘It also effectively meant that the cost of processing the ore now at the present moment exceeds the price that [SG Iron] is able to obtain for the ore on the international market. In other words, it has become financially impossible to continue to mine.’

He stated, ‘Currently, as at 30 September 2014 [SG Iron’s] total indebtedness to its creditors amounted to approximately E42 million (US$4.2 million). Although that amount seems large, [SG Iron] would very easily be able to pay these creditors if it were in a position to sell the product that it currently has and more so if the price of iron ore recovers.’

However, he did not report that even at the lowest price of US$55 per tonne, if he himself, as the King’s representative, were to permit the 100,000 tonnes of ore stockpiled to be sold it would raise US$5.5 million, more than the US$4.2 million SG Iron owed its creditors.

In his statement, Sihle Dlamini made no reference to the US$10 million loan that had been made to the King that he subsequently refused to pay back.

16 December 2014

On the request of the Judicial Manager appointed by the Court, the Court ordered the provisional liquidation, or winding up, of SG Iron by an Order dated 16 December 2014.

22 January 2015

A Notice of Investment Dispute from SARL prepared for theInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on 22 January 2015 stated the Judicial Manager, who it said was controlled by the King through Sihle Dlamini and Mbuso Dlamini, informed all creditors / vendors of SG Iron of its provisional liquidation, but failed to inform its largest creditor and primary shareholder, SARL, in writing of the event. He also failed to inform Eltina Limited, a major creditor of SG Iron, who bought the cargo of SG Iron and had provided US$10 million as a loan to SG Iron.

SARL reported. ‘The Judicial Manager met with [Sihle Dlamini and Mbuso Dlamini] the Director representing the King and Government almost every day and took instructions only from them’, not the SARL directors, or Eltina Limited. 

SARL reported, ‘[SARL] should have been given the opportunity to put forward their case before the Judicial Manager, since there were numerous alternatives to revive the company, in a violation of their due process rights they have not been allowed to do so by [the Swaziland directors].’

SARL added the Judicial Manager, ‘acting solely on the instructions of [the King’s] representatives, wholly failed his duty’, and when SARL and Rethenam, as Chairman of SG Iron, asked to sell cargo at a higher price even to its own competitor, the Judicial Manager ignored this request. 

‘The only possible explanation for his refusal was that [the Swaziland representatives] knew that, if a cargo was sold, the company would receive cash flow and SG Iron could not be liquidated.’

The closure of the mining project cost 700 people their jobs in Swaziland and it was estimated that several hundred jobs were also lost at the Port of Maputo, Mozambique.

SARL also reported that it had ‘direct evidence’ that the mine was being guarded by the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force. 

‘[King Mswati III] is the Commander-in-Chief of the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force, providing further evidence of the wholesale expropriation of [SARL’s] investment by state organs of [Swaziland] including the King’s Office, [Swaziland’s] judiciary and [Swaziland’s] military,’ it stated.

SARL added that as a result of SARL’s closure its ‘investment has been expropriated’, and the King’s US$10 million dividend / loan ‘has been written off by judicial decree’.

SARL added, ‘Having expropriated [SARL’s] investments and avoided the repayment of US$56 million in loans to finance the investment, it is understood that the Judicial Manager is now attempting to sell SG Iron to third parties for a song.’

The notice stated it had ‘suffered direct harm in the amount of no less than US$141,147,440.17, for the direct financial consequences of the behaviour of the King and his representatives.

In addition it is claiming US$57,186,022.53 for its advance and loan owed by SG Iron to SARL. SARL also stated that Eltina Limited was owed US$5,426,954.66.

In its notice of investment dispute, SARL said the order from Sihle Dlamini issued in August 2014 that no more iron ore should be sold was ‘a deliberate attempt to create an artificial cash crisis’ at SG Iron in order to gain control of the company and expropriate the company of its investments. 

SARL linked the move to destroy the company to 6 April 2012 when the request was made by King Mswati III, for the US$10 million loan.

‘It appears to be the desire to avoid the repayment of this advance dividend / loan to HMK [His Majesty the King] that lies at the root of the expropriation of [SARL’s] investments in Swaziland,’ SARL stated.

1 February 2015

The Observer on Sunday, a newspaper in Swaziland, in effect owned by King Mswati, attacked SARL and its Notice of Investment Dispute. It quoted Sihle Dlamini, who called the notice ‘a smear campaign’. He also likened SARL to ‘terrorist’ organisations.

Following publication of this article, William Kirtley, attorney to SARL, wrote to the Observer, to say, ‘The only person who stood to gain anything from this was HMK [the King], since the joint venture had provided an advance payment / loan of US$10 million and, indeed, during one of the final board meetings it was repeatedly requested that this be written off SG Iron’s books.’

8 February 2015

The Observer on Sunday, part of the Swazi Observer group of newspapers, in effect owned by King Mswati and described bythe Media Institute of Southern Africa in a 2013 report on press freedom in the kingdom as ‘a pure propaganda machine for the royal family’, attacked SARL and said it was, ‘lying by claiming to have filed a notice of arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against the Kingdom of Swaziland’. It said it had proof that no such notice had been lodged.

In fact, SARL had never claimed to have ‘filed a notice of arbitration.’ In a media release dated 29 January 2015, it was announced SARL had submitted ‘a notice of investment dispute’.  A notice of investment dispute is first filed to see if the amicable resolution of a dispute is possible. Only when it is clear that the amicable resolution of a dispute is not possible is the ‘Notice for Arbitration’ filed. 

ENDS

* Special thanks to Swazi Media Commentary for this story