Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in exile – Swaziland

This is an excerpt from a document titled “Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in exile” taken from South African History Online. It examines in detail MK activities in a number of African countries, and briefly the international support from non-African countries. Reproduced herein is an excerpt focusing on Swaziland.

If anyone has more information on the subject, please assist.

Swaziland

Background

The relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) and Swaziland dates back to the formation of the SANNC in 1912. Swazi queen regent Labotsibeni and crown prince Sobhuza, who became King Sobhuza II in 1921, financed the Abantu Batho newspaper, a mouthpiece of the SANNC. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Swazis were involved in ICU and ANC activities, particularly in the Transvaal.  For instance, Richard W Msimang, who grew up in Swaziland, and Benjamin Nxumalo, a relative of King Sobhuza II, were involved with the South African Native National Congress (SANNC)  later renamed the ANC. Nxumalo served as Swaziland's representative on the committee that wrote the SANNC (later ANC) constitution of 1919. He later formed a Swaziland branch of the ANC in Sobhuza’s house in Sophiatown.

From the early 1900s there were moves to incorporate Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana (the three British Protectorates) into South Africa. When South Africa imposed apartheid and pulled out of the Commonwealth in 1961, the idea of incorporation was abandoned. Swaziland was briefly granted limited self-rule by the British government before the passing of the Swaziland Independence Act in 1968. After this, on 6 September 1968 Swaziland became an independent country with a constitutional monarchy under King Sobhuza II. The strategic location of Swaziland in relation to South Africa, particularly Natal, and its proximity to Johannesburg and Pretoria, made Swaziland a haven for members of South African liberation movements facing violent repression in their country. Significantly, in late 1968 the South African government amended the South African Police Act to allow members of the police force to operate in other countries, and government spies and informants began operating in Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and other countries.

The Establishment of MK in Swaziland

Thula Simpson, whose work focused on the ANC in Swaziland between 1960 and 1979, notes that South African refugees began arriving in Swaziland in significant numbers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This development was due to increasing repression in South Africa as the apartheid government began to pass and vigorously enforce repressive legislation. By the mid-1960s there were a number of ANC and MK activists in Swaziland. By the time Stanley Mabizela arrived in Swaziland in 1965, Joseph Nduli, Ablon ‘Bafana’ Duma and Albert Dhlomo were already based there. Their task was to develop underground structures of MK cells by recruiting South African refugees in Swaziland. They worked with people inside South Africa, particularly in Natal, to facilitate movement across the two countries for MK assignments. Recruitment was not an easy task as some of the people were not politically active, enjoying a relatively comfortable life as middle class income earners – British policy sought to incorporate refugees into Swazi society by allowing them to work and settle there.

In the period around 1974 and 1975 the ANC embarked on a process to rebuild its structures in Swaziland. In December 1974, Thabo Mbeki and Maxwell Sisulu arrived in Swaziland and were tasked with improving relations with the Swazi monarchy and recruiting refugees for the movement. At a meeting in September 1975 the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki and Oliver Tambo met with King Sobhuza II. Later, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng and Martin Ramokgadi also spent time in Swaziland to establish an MK military network. Zuma was involved particularly in forging links between Natal and Swaziland, while Nkadimeng and Ramokgadi worked on links to the Transvaal. Safe-houses for MK recruits in transit were also established in various areas of Manzini.

When Mozambique gained independence in 1975 the number of MK cadres passing through Swaziland to Mozambique and then to other countries increased. Swaziland was used as transit point for MK recruits on their way to military training in other African countries, and in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1977 the ANC used properties in Ngwane Park in Manzini, Swaziland, to assist with the processing of refugees who wanted to join its ranks.  At these recruitment centres, potential recruits were instructed to write their biographies, state the reasons why they wanted to join the ANC, and describe how they ended up in Swaziland. They were then taken to Maputo, where they were vetted by the ANC’s security apparatus.

King Sobhuza II was initially sympathetic to the ANC and generally turned a blind eye to its activities, but as MK began using Swaziland as a transit point for weapons headed for South Africa, there was a change of attitude. A number of raids were conducted by the Swazis, resulting in the confiscation of ANC weapons in transit.  According to Simpson, serious problems arose when two groups of recruits reported to the Swazi police who in turn informed the South African government.

The information provided resulted in the capture of Samson Lukhele, “a taxi operator who worked for the ANC as a courier shuttling letters, money and recruits between Natal and Swaziland”. It was the information supplied by Lukhele that led to the arrest on 18 March 1976 of Joseph Mdluli, a key figure in the ANC underground in the Durban area. That same month two other people, Joseph “Mpisi” Nduli and Cleophas Ndlovu were kidnapped by South African security forces near the Swaziland border in a  trap set by the latter and Lukhele under the pretext of bringing recruits. Furthermore, Dhlomo, Mbeki and Zuma were arrested by the Swazi police and detained at Mbabane maximum security prison. They were nearly deported to South Africa, but Stanley Mabizela, Moses Mabhida and Thomas Nkobi managed to secure their release. They were subsequently deported to Mozambique.

On 17 February 1982 King Sobhuza II signed a secret agreement with South Africa. The pact bound both parties not to allow “any act which involves a threat or use of force against each other’s territory” and called for “action individually or collectively as may be deemed necessary or expedient to eliminate this evil”. After the agreement was signed, Stanley Mabizela, the ANC’s representative in Swaziland, was forced to leave the country. The death of King Sobhuza II in August 1982 worsened the position of the ANC in Swaziland as the country terminated the historical and sentimental connections between the Swazi monarchy and the ANC. The signing of the agreement was taken as a licence by Pretoria to deal with ANC activists in Swaziland in any way they wanted. In addition, the Swaziland security establishment mounted a sustained propaganda campaign and arrested many activists, particularly in the 1980s.

MK Missions launched from Swaziland

Elias Mabizela points out that the gunning down of Detective Sergeant Chapi Hlubi, a notorious police officer in Soweto, in January 1978, marked the beginning of an escalation of MK attacks inside South Africa. Hlubi was fingered as one of the black policeman who opened fire on protesting students in the 1976 uprising. In commemoration of Isandlwana, 1979 was declared the ‘Year of the Spear’ by the ANC, and 1980 was declared the ‘Year of the Charter’ to mark 25 years of the Freedom Charter. Both years were geared towards building morale for increased ANC activity inside South Africa, with Swaziland playing an important role as a transit point for MK cadres moving in and out of South Africa. Cadres were infiltrated into the Transvaal via the Jeppe’s Reef and the Oshoek border posts. MK used the Golela and Pongola border posts to link up with Natal underground machinery.

In 1980, MK carried out a sabotage attack on the Sasol 1 plant. They also attacked the Voortrekker military base in 1981, the Tonga outpost in 1982, and set off bombs in Hectorspruit in 1982 and Pretoria in 1983. All these were launched by MK operatives using Swaziland either as a base or a transit point.

Perhaps one of the most important areas from which MK launched operations was Ingwavuma in KwaZulu Natal, a town located less than five kilometres from the border with Swaziland. MK cadres, particularly those based in Natal, used the town as a transit point for guerrillas infiltrating into South Africa from Swaziland and Mozambique. Once in town, they stayed underground in safe-houses to avoid detection. Among those who played an important role in using the town was Jameson Nongolozi Mngomezulu, an active ANC and MK member born in Ingwavuma. After joining MK, he was deployed in Swaziland as a base commander and became central in facilitating the movement of cadres between Swaziland and Natal. When threats to his life escalated he fled to Swaziland.

Mngomezulu’s sister, Nokuhamba Nyawo, was also an important player. After being recruited to MK she gathered intelligence and provided supplies to MK operatives moving through the area. Nyawo would receive guerrillas passing through the area and help them skip the border into Swazi­land. As Jacob Zuma noted: ‘Through her efforts and those of many people from Ingwavuma, the MK secured a very strategic base and point of entry into the country, easily accessible from both Mozambique and Swaziland.’ Weapon consignments destined for MK in Natal regularly passed through the area, especially in the 1980s.

Jabulani Nobleman Nxumalo was deployed to Swaziland in 1983, disguised as a reporter for the Swaziland Observer under the pseudonym of Jabulani Dlamini. He was detained by the Swazi police and forced to leave the country in 1983, but he returned to Swaziland in December of the same year under a new pseudonym, this time setting in the Shiselweni district in the south of the country. It was from here that Nxumalo crossed the border into KwaZulu-Natal, setting up an MK unit based in Ingwavuma. He served as a commissar for MK based in rural Natal, a move important for the establishment of Operation Vulindlela. In 1984, Nxumalo was once again arrested by the Swazi police and deported to Tanzania. Increased MK military activity in the Ingwavuma area was linked to Operation Ingwavuma, a move by the ANC to establish military bases in the area and politicise the rural population to create a fertile and safe ground for MK missions.

Operation Ingwavuma

Operation Ingwavuma was conceived and implemented in 1984 by the Natal Regional Command of MK, in conjunction with its substructure known as the Northern Natal Military Command (NNMC). A political commissar was appointed, his job being to work as deputy commander liaising with the chief of staff, chief of intelligence and chief of logistics. Among the leading figures mapping out the operation was Zwelibanzi Nyanda.

The initial phase involved doing groundwork for the creation of guerrilla operational areas in Northern Natal by first politicising the local population. Other preparations included mapping out the terrain, recruiting people and establishing training bases. It was envisaged that recruits would establish mass peasant political organisations and underground units that would be assisted by MK military structures. Trained MK guerrillas were to constitute the core of the structure.

The area of Ingwavuma was chosen because of its strategic importance, as it is situated on the most Northern tip of Natal which borders Swaziland and Mozambique. MK and ANC operatives in Swaziland were a vital link between the movement and the local population. MK sought to take advantage of simmering anti-government discontent among the local population, who were unhappy that the government planned to cede the area of Ingwavuma and the KwaNgwane bantustan to Swaziland. Some of those who opposed the move became sympathetic to MK and joined the organization to undergo military training. Based on this development, MK concluded that it was possible to start a People's War at Ingwavuma.

A two-man reconnaissance team sent to the area for two weeks returned with a negative report about the possibility of establishing bases. Another team, however, compiled a report that encouraged the establishment of bases. Subsequently, two units were established, one named Nozishada and the other Maqendindaba. Both units trained several people from the local population. One MK recruit from the area was captured by the police and leaked information about the existence of MK bases in the area. South African security forces arrived to gather more information and later the KwaZulu police combed the area. One of the comrades, known as Post (possibly Linda Khuzwayo), went to the village and found that the Maqendindaba base was surrounded by SADF troops. He fired his pistol to warn four members of the unit, who escaped through a secret route, but Post was shot and killed. Others were arrested and sentenced to prison terms on Robben Island.  Operation Ingwavuma thus proved to be a failure to establish an MK guerrilla force on the ground strong enough to ignite a people’s war.

Response by the South African government

The government responded to the presence of MK in Swaziland by bombing safe-houses, abducting and turning ANC activists into askaris or murdering those who refused to cooperate, and assassinations. Their activities received support from the Swaziland police, who stepped up patrols along the border with South Africa to prevent crossing by the activists.  In addition to cooperation from Swaziland, South Africa used Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) operatives to carry out its work. The South African government also continued to pile pressure on the Swazi government to deal with ANC and MK, particularly after the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique – this because some MK operatives fled to Swaziland from Mozambique.

Abductions, Arrests and Detentions

One of the methods used by the South African government to neutralise MK operatives in Swaziland was abduction. The security branch in Port Natal played a critical role in the abduction, detention and murder of political activists and MK operatives who worked between Swaziland and Natal. Abductions began in the 1960s, but increased in the 1970s and 80s. Simpson notes that ‘the first refugee abducted from Swaziland was Rosemary Ann Wentzel – a Liberal Party member involved in underground work for the African Resistance Movement (ARM) … on 11 August 1964’.

Joseph Nduli and Cleophas Ndlovu, two MK operatives who carried out ANC underground work in the Greater Durban area, were kidnapped by South African security forces near the Swaziland border in mid-March 1976. Together with Ndlovu, Nduli recruited and facilitated the movement of MK recruits into Swaziland on their way to military training. The pair were taken to Island Rock near Sodwana, where they were interrogated. Ndlovu was assaulted, blindfolded, cuffed and had a rope put round his neck while tied to a tree. The pair were later tried alongside Harry Gwala and nine others in Pietermaritzburg from August 1976 to July 1977. The surgeon, Mr R Denyssen le Roux, filed an affidavit which noted scars on Nduli's forehead, the back of his head, neck, forearms and legs, pointing to signs of torture.

In February 1981 Dhayiah Joe Pillay, a South African refugee working as a teacher at St Joseph’s mission near Manzini, was kidnapped. One of his captors dropped a passport, leading to the arrest of some of Pillay’s kidnappers, who turned out to be members of RENAMO. The South African government intervened and asked the prosecutor not to oppose bail. This resulted in the release of Pillay’s captors and their disappearance. Pillay was released on 10 March 1981.

In December 1982 several ANC activists in Swaziland were rounded up and expelled to Mozambique.

In April 1984, Gaboutwelwe Christopher Mosiane, Vikelisizwe Colin Khumalo, Michael Dauwanga Matikinca, Ernest Nonjawangu and Glorius ‘Glory’ Lefoshie Sedibe (commonly known as the ‘Bhunya Four’) were abducted from Swaziland.

On 15 December 1986 South African security forces kidnapped Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Mandla Maseko and Simon Dladla in Swaziland and brought them to stand trial in South Africa. They were all tried and convicted; Ebrahim received a 20-year sentence, while Maseko and Dladla were sentenced to 23 and 12 years respectively.

Assassinations

On 4 June 1980 Patrick Makau, a member of MK; seven-year-old Patrick Nkosi, the son of an active ANC member; and Mawick Nkosi were killed in two separate bomb blasts in houses in Manzini. The attack came in response to an MK attack on the Sasol oil refinery in Secunda. The operation was ordered by Colonel JJ Viktor and Dirk Coetzee and the head of the Security Branch in Ermelo.

On 8 December 1981 two ANC men were ambushed close to the border and killed in their vehicle.

On 4 June 1982 Petrus Nzima Nyawose, the deputy ANC Representative in Swaziland, and his wife Jabu were killed in a car bomb planted by members of the security branch. In December 1983, a flat was raided in Manzini where ANC member Zwelakhe Nyanda and a Swazi national were killed.

In December 1981 members of the Special Task Force, a branch of the South African Police and Security Branch, killed two MK members in Swaziland to avenge the attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte Military Base on 12 August 1981.

After investigating and interrogating a person known only as Molefe, the detainee implicated Mnisi, a member of MK who under interrogation revealed information about MK operations inside the country, and its base in Swaziland. Mnisi was turned into an askari and ordered to lure MK operative George to meet him at the Swaziland border, where would be arrested. Mnisi and other members of the police proceeded to the Oshoek border post on the Swaziland border. Members of the task-force crossed the border and took up positions near the agreed meeting. George’s vehicle stopped some distance from the meeting point, throwing the operation into jeopardy. But when George’s car moved within range, members of Special Task Force fired, killing George and his MK comrade Brown.

In 1983 Brigadier Schoon ordered the elimination of Zwelibanzi Nyanda, a commander of MK units operating in Swaziland. Accompanied by Captain Eugene de Kock, among other security policemen, Jan Hattingh Cronje crossed into Swaziland and stayed at a hotel in Mbabane, where they prepared for the operation. At night, they raided the house where Nyanda and lived with another MK member, Keith MacFadden. Both were killed, while the informer who had disclosed their address was allowed to escape.

In June 1985 South African policemen and a member of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) crossed into Swaziland and kidnapped Jameson Nongolozi Mngomezulu and two other people. He was taken to Moolman, just outside Piet Retief in KwaZulu-Natal, before being moved to Leeuwspoor, a farm close to Jozini which was the headquarters of the northern Natal security police. After being severely tortured he lapsed into a coma and died. The security police then destroyed his body by blowing it up at a missile range near Sodwana Bay.

A year later, in June 1986, Jabulani Sydney Msibi, an MK operative who also served as the bodyguard of ANC president Oliver Tambo, was kidnapped in Swaziland on instructions from the Security Branch. He was brought to South Africa and taken to Daisy Farm, where he was assaulted and tortured. When efforts by the security branch failed to turn him into an askari, he was killed.

On 14 August 1986, two MK operatives, Jeremiah Timola and Mmbengeni Kone, were killed by members of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch while they were on their way to South Africa.

The following year, in June 1988, Nontsikelelo ‘Ntsiki’ Cotoza, a young member of MK, was killed in an ambush on the Swaziland border.

Ms Phila Portia Ndwandwe, an acting commander of MK who operated from Swaziland, was also killed in 1988. She facilitated the infiltration of ANC cadres into Natal before she was abducted by members of the Durban Security Branch. After capture, she refused to cooperate with the police and they did not have enough evidence to prosecute her. Instead of releasing her, the police executed her and buried her on the Elandskop farm outside Pietermaritzburg in October 1988.

In July 1988, Emmanuel Mthokizisi Mbova Mzimela, an MK member was abducted in Swaziland by the members of the security branch in Durban. When he refused to cooperate with the police by becoming their askari, he was executed and buried on a farm in the Elandskop area.

In May 1987, Theophilus ‘Viva’ Dlodlo, an MK operative, was killed after he was ambushed while in his car in Swaziland. At the time of his death he had been married for five months and had a just had a son.

On 9 July 1987 Job Tabane (alias Cassius Maake), who was the youngest member of the ANC National Executive Committee, and Sello Motau were killed in Swaziland after Motau picked up Tabane from the airport in Mbabane and their vehicle was forced off the road between Matsapa and Mbabane.

Conclusion

After his release from prison, Nelson Mandela visited Swaziland in November 1990 and met with some exiles still in the country. With the collapse of apartheid, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up to examine human rights violations that occurred under the apartheid. During this process the ANC submitted a list of 52 MK operatives killed by the apartheid security forces in Swaziland. However, the amnesty committee only received applications for 14 of the targeted killings. The number of MK operatives killed on the Swaziland-South Africa borders is higher compared to other countries that shared a border with South Africa. This underlines the strategic importance of Swaziland to MK in the struggle against apartheid.

Names of those killed in Swaziland or abducted from Swaziland and killed in SA

• Jameson Nongolozi Mngomezulu
• Victor M Mgadi
• Jeremiah Timola
• Mmbengeni Kone
• Zwelibanzi Nyanda
• Titus Dladla
• Thuluso A Matima
• MK George
• MK Brown
• Patrick Makau
• Mzwandile Radebe
• Oupa Funani
• Emmanuel Mthokizisi Mbova Mzimela
• Nontsikelelo “Ntsiki” Cotoza
• Portia Ndwandwe
• Theophilus ‘Viva’ Dlodlo
• Job Tabane ( alias Cassius Make)
• Sello Motau
• Keith MacFadden
• Petrus Nzima Nyawose

* The above is not a complete list, but it lists those covered in the narrative received.

SWAZILAND: HOW SWAZI KING DESTROYED IRON MINE*

Reported by Swazi Media Commentary

Swaziland’s absolute monarch King Mswati III and his personal representative Sihle Dlamini were at the very heart of events that led to the collapse of the mining company SG Iron at the Ngwenya Iron Ore Mine. It had debts of US$4 million when it closed and more than 700 jobs were lost. King Mswati took a US$10 million loan from the company less than six months after it started trading which he refused to pay back when it hit difficulties. 

A compensation claim for at least US$141 million has been prepared by Southern Africa Resources Ltd (SARL), against the Kingdom of Swaziland at the International Centre for Settlement of INVESTMENT Disputes (ICSID).

SARL held a 50 percent stake in SG Iron Ore Mining (PTY) Ltd (SG Iron), which had formerly been known as Salgaocar Swaziland (PTY) Ltd. The Swaziland Government held 25 percent of the shares and the King personally held 25 percent ‘in trust for the nation.’ 

The mine was forced to cease trading in August 2014 after a series of events orchestrated by Sihle Dlamini, who is Director Administration at the King’s Office and Assistant Private Secretary to the King. He was also the King’s personal representative on the SG Iron board of directors.

Here is a step by step guide to what happened.

30 September 2010

SG Iron Ore Mining (PTY) Ltd. (when it was still called Salgaocar Swaziland (PTY) Ltd), was registered in accordance with the laws of Swaziland on 30 September 2010 under Certificate of Incorporation No.1196, with its principal business of operations at the Old Ngwenya Mine, Ngwenya, in the Hhohho district of Swaziland.

SG Iron’s stated goal was to reprocess iron ore dumps left over by the Anglo American Mining Company in the late 1970’s, when it ceased mining operations in the area, and to secure the main mine lease for 30 years once the iron ore dumps had been cleared. 

Due to advancements in technology, it had become scientifically possible to process the dumps and upgrade them into sellable grade ore. This project would create new jobs in Swaziland, while creating a new source of wealth for Swaziland, as well as clearing Swaziland of the dumps left by the Anglo American Mining Corporation and restarting mining activities.

30 June 2011

King Mswati, who as absolute monarch in Swaziland has sole control over mining rights in the kingdom, granted SG Iron a Mining Lease for seven years. The company agreed to pay the King ‘in trust for the Swazi Nation’ a royalty of 3 percent. It also gave the King 25 percent of the total company issued share capital at no cost. It also gave a further 25 percent of the issued share capital to the Swaziland Government, again at no cost. The remaining 50 percent of issued share capital went to SARL.

The King holds shares ‘in trust for the Swazi Nation’, but it iswidely reported outside of Swaziland that in fact he has received millions of dollars from international companies such as phone giant MTN; sugar conglomerates Illovo and Remgro; Sun International hotels and beverages firm SAB Millerto, which he spends on himself and his family. 

The King, who rules over an impoverished kingdom of only 1.4 million people, has 13 palaces, a fleet of top-of-the range BMS and Mercedes cars and a private jet airplane. Meanwhile, seven in ten of his subjects exist on incomes of less than US$2 per day.

As a general undertaking, the Mining Lease provided that each party should ‘act in such manner as shall be necessary in order to give effect to [the] Mining lease’. That mean they should all have worked to make sure the company was a success. 

It was agreed SARL, being the 50 percent shareholder of SG Iron, had management control of SG Iron, which was in charge of, and responsible for, day-to-day running of SG Iron. SARL was to provide all financial support and technical expertise necessary for SG IRON to succeed.

Article 6.8 of the Mining Lease provided that the Chairman in addition to having his own vote on the Board of Directors should have a casting vote. Shanmuga Rethenam was appointed as the Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors of SG Iron, and Sivarama Petla was appointed as its Chief Executive Officer. Both Executive Chairman and CEO were nominee and representatives of SARL.

Mbuso Dlamini was appointed as the Director for and on behalf of the Swaziland Government and Sihle Dlamini was appointed as the Director for and on behalf of the King.

SG Iron put up approximately US$50 million to start the mining operations and added further capital. The King and the Swaziland Government made no financial contributions.

21 October 2011

The official inauguration of operations was on 21 October 2011 with the dispatch of ore to Maputo Port in Mozambique. On 21 December 2011, the first shipment was carried out from Maputo Port and on 9 March 2012, a rail services from Mpaka to Maputo Port, Mozambique, started.

16 April 2012

Less than six months after operations began, King Mswati, through his representative Sihle Dlamini, asked for and received an advanced payment / loan of US$10 million on the King’s future dividend. This was at a meeting of the Board of Directors of Salgaocar Swaziland held in Mbabane, Swaziland, on 16 April 2012. The money was to be repaid from future dividends payable to the King. 

There was no public announcement made that the King received the money which he held ‘in trust for the nation’ and it is not known how he spent it. This later fuelled speculation that he had used the money to fund his own personal lavish lifestyle. 

26 April 2012

Reports began to appear on the Internet and later in newspapers in Swaziland that King Mswati had taken delivery of a privateDouglas DC-9 jet and that it had been given to him as a gift bySalgaocar. 

The company refused to confirm or deny the gift. The Swazi Government was lukewarm in its denial. The Times of Swaziland reported, ‘Dismissing the rumours, government Press Secretary Percy Simelane said “That is pure speculation.  The donor has asked to remain anonymous and it will be like that.”’  

Barnabas Dlamini, the Swazi Prime Minister, claimed to the media that the jet had been donated by ‘development partners’ of Swaziland.  

21August 2014

Sihle Dlamini, representing the King at SG Iron wrote to the CEO of SG Iron, Sivarama Petla, instructing him not to sell any more cargo on 21 August 2014. He did this without consulting the major shareholder, SARL. Since that day all attempts by SG Iron to sell cargo were blocked.

Contrary to the terms of the Mining Lease, the Board of Directors was not consulted about the decision to stop sales of iron ore. The Chairman, who was to chair all board meetings under Article 6.7 of the Mining Lease, and who also possessed a right of veto, was not even informed of the King’s decision.

In October 2014, in a founding affidavit at the Swaziland High Court to have the company placed under Judicial Management, Sihle Dlamini would state that a shareholders dispute at SARL in Singapore had made it impossible for management decisions to be taken at SG Iron. He also stated that the fall in the world price of iron ore had made production at the mine uneconomical.

After 21 August 2014

Blocking the sale of iron ore meant no trade could take place and SG Iron’s operations were brought to an abrupt standstill. Since no money was coming into the company from the sale of cargoes there was a cash-flow crisis. 

Sales could have resumed at any time because more than 100,000 tonnes of iron ore remained at Maputo Port, Mpaka Railway Siding and at the Mine Stockyard. In his High Court affidavit in October 2014, Sihle Dlamini revealed he had given instructions for ore to be stockpiled until the price of iron ore recovered.

SARL also requested that the King repay the full or part of the US$10 million loan / advance dividend to allow SG Iron to continue operating. The King refused to do this, instead the King’s representative Sihle Dlamini demanded that SARL inject more capital into the business, something it would not do while shipment of cargoes remained blocked.

SARL would say in January 2015 that it felt it had been held hostage by the King’s representative’s decision to unilaterally stop all shipments of cargo.

22 September 2014

At a board meeting of SG Iron held in Mbanane, Sihle Dlamini representing the King and Mbuso Dlamini, representing the Swazi Government, expressed dissatisfaction at the status of the company, saying that a shareholder dispute at SARL was impacting on SG Iron, something which was disputed by SG Iron.

The two men gave an ultimatum that fresh funds should be injected into the project no later than 26 September 2014. The Chairman of SG Iron, appointed by SARL, was present at this board meeting, and he requested that management allow the sale of the cargo, which would release sufficient funds to keep the company operating.

SARL again requested that the King should, ‘for the good of the company’s workers, its shareholders and the kingdom of Swaziland’, repay the full or part of the US$10 million loan / advance dividend to allow the continued operation of SG Iron. Sihle Dlamini, the King’s representative, refused.

Subsequent to the meeting, Sihle Dlamini, representing the King, asked SARL to wipe out the US$10 million loan.

29 September 2014

In a letter dated 29 September 2014, SARL refused to write off the King’s debt. SARL said in January 2015 that in response to this, Sihle Dlamini took a unilateral decision to stop operations and place the company into Judicial Management and then liquidation. This decision was taken without discussions with the major shareholder or considering the voting rights in place at SG Iron.

3 October 2014

Sihle Dlamini representing the King and Mbuso Dlamini, representing the Swaziland Government, called for a meeting of the Board of Directors and despite being told by the Chairman of the Board Shanmuga Rethenam that he could not attend, they went ahead with the meeting without him.

This was the first Board Meeting that had been held without the Chairman’s presence in the history of SG Iron. Sihle Dlamini, the King’s representative, served as the Chairman of the meeting, although he represented only 25 percent of the company’s share capital and SARL, the 50 percent shareholder, was supposed to have control of the board.

Sihle Dlamini and Mbuso Dlamani both resolved to place SG Iron under Judicial Management, without seeking the Chairman’s consent, rather than permitting operations and cargo sale to continue.

10 October 2014

SG Iron was placed under provisional Judicial Management by an Order of the High Court of Swaziland dated 10 October 2014. This order was based on the founding affidavit of Sihle Dlamini, the King’s representative. The Judicial Manager was able to immediately take control and assess the affairs, assets and liabilities of SG Iron.

In his statement, Dlamini said the company, ‘commenced operations on the 21^st of October 2011 and it has been extremely successful to date and has been a major income earner for the Kingdom of Swaziland.

‘[It] has also provided a number of investment opportunities to local transport contractors, construction companies and heavy plant and machinery contractors who carry out the bulk of its mining operations at Ngwenya.’

He added the company, ‘is not in an insolvent position in that its assets exceed its liabilities’. He said, however, the Board of Directors had ‘become hamstrung’ and was unable to take effective decisions on the operations of the company.

He said, ‘During or about December 2013, a serious shareholder dispute arose between the shareholders of the investor SARL, which dispute has resulted in arbitration proceedings being instituted between themselves in Singapore.’

He said he was not, ‘fully apprised of the nature of the dispute’, but nonetheless believed it meant that SARL representatives on the Board of SG Iron were unable to take decisions.

Sihle Dlamini also said that the falling price of iron ore had impacted the company. He said the price fell from E1,360 (about US$136) per tonne in January / February 2014 to E550 (US$55) per tonne. This was a new six-year low of the price of iron ore. 

‘It also effectively meant that the cost of processing the ore now at the present moment exceeds the price that [SG Iron] is able to obtain for the ore on the international market. In other words, it has become financially impossible to continue to mine.’

He stated, ‘Currently, as at 30 September 2014 [SG Iron’s] total indebtedness to its creditors amounted to approximately E42 million (US$4.2 million). Although that amount seems large, [SG Iron] would very easily be able to pay these creditors if it were in a position to sell the product that it currently has and more so if the price of iron ore recovers.’

However, he did not report that even at the lowest price of US$55 per tonne, if he himself, as the King’s representative, were to permit the 100,000 tonnes of ore stockpiled to be sold it would raise US$5.5 million, more than the US$4.2 million SG Iron owed its creditors.

In his statement, Sihle Dlamini made no reference to the US$10 million loan that had been made to the King that he subsequently refused to pay back.

16 December 2014

On the request of the Judicial Manager appointed by the Court, the Court ordered the provisional liquidation, or winding up, of SG Iron by an Order dated 16 December 2014.

22 January 2015

A Notice of Investment Dispute from SARL prepared for theInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on 22 January 2015 stated the Judicial Manager, who it said was controlled by the King through Sihle Dlamini and Mbuso Dlamini, informed all creditors / vendors of SG Iron of its provisional liquidation, but failed to inform its largest creditor and primary shareholder, SARL, in writing of the event. He also failed to inform Eltina Limited, a major creditor of SG Iron, who bought the cargo of SG Iron and had provided US$10 million as a loan to SG Iron.

SARL reported. ‘The Judicial Manager met with [Sihle Dlamini and Mbuso Dlamini] the Director representing the King and Government almost every day and took instructions only from them’, not the SARL directors, or Eltina Limited. 

SARL reported, ‘[SARL] should have been given the opportunity to put forward their case before the Judicial Manager, since there were numerous alternatives to revive the company, in a violation of their due process rights they have not been allowed to do so by [the Swaziland directors].’

SARL added the Judicial Manager, ‘acting solely on the instructions of [the King’s] representatives, wholly failed his duty’, and when SARL and Rethenam, as Chairman of SG Iron, asked to sell cargo at a higher price even to its own competitor, the Judicial Manager ignored this request. 

‘The only possible explanation for his refusal was that [the Swaziland representatives] knew that, if a cargo was sold, the company would receive cash flow and SG Iron could not be liquidated.’

The closure of the mining project cost 700 people their jobs in Swaziland and it was estimated that several hundred jobs were also lost at the Port of Maputo, Mozambique.

SARL also reported that it had ‘direct evidence’ that the mine was being guarded by the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force. 

‘[King Mswati III] is the Commander-in-Chief of the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force, providing further evidence of the wholesale expropriation of [SARL’s] investment by state organs of [Swaziland] including the King’s Office, [Swaziland’s] judiciary and [Swaziland’s] military,’ it stated.

SARL added that as a result of SARL’s closure its ‘investment has been expropriated’, and the King’s US$10 million dividend / loan ‘has been written off by judicial decree’.

SARL added, ‘Having expropriated [SARL’s] investments and avoided the repayment of US$56 million in loans to finance the investment, it is understood that the Judicial Manager is now attempting to sell SG Iron to third parties for a song.’

The notice stated it had ‘suffered direct harm in the amount of no less than US$141,147,440.17, for the direct financial consequences of the behaviour of the King and his representatives.

In addition it is claiming US$57,186,022.53 for its advance and loan owed by SG Iron to SARL. SARL also stated that Eltina Limited was owed US$5,426,954.66.

In its notice of investment dispute, SARL said the order from Sihle Dlamini issued in August 2014 that no more iron ore should be sold was ‘a deliberate attempt to create an artificial cash crisis’ at SG Iron in order to gain control of the company and expropriate the company of its investments. 

SARL linked the move to destroy the company to 6 April 2012 when the request was made by King Mswati III, for the US$10 million loan.

‘It appears to be the desire to avoid the repayment of this advance dividend / loan to HMK [His Majesty the King] that lies at the root of the expropriation of [SARL’s] investments in Swaziland,’ SARL stated.

1 February 2015

The Observer on Sunday, a newspaper in Swaziland, in effect owned by King Mswati, attacked SARL and its Notice of Investment Dispute. It quoted Sihle Dlamini, who called the notice ‘a smear campaign’. He also likened SARL to ‘terrorist’ organisations.

Following publication of this article, William Kirtley, attorney to SARL, wrote to the Observer, to say, ‘The only person who stood to gain anything from this was HMK [the King], since the joint venture had provided an advance payment / loan of US$10 million and, indeed, during one of the final board meetings it was repeatedly requested that this be written off SG Iron’s books.’

8 February 2015

The Observer on Sunday, part of the Swazi Observer group of newspapers, in effect owned by King Mswati and described bythe Media Institute of Southern Africa in a 2013 report on press freedom in the kingdom as ‘a pure propaganda machine for the royal family’, attacked SARL and said it was, ‘lying by claiming to have filed a notice of arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against the Kingdom of Swaziland’. It said it had proof that no such notice had been lodged.

In fact, SARL had never claimed to have ‘filed a notice of arbitration.’ In a media release dated 29 January 2015, it was announced SARL had submitted ‘a notice of investment dispute’.  A notice of investment dispute is first filed to see if the amicable resolution of a dispute is possible. Only when it is clear that the amicable resolution of a dispute is not possible is the ‘Notice for Arbitration’ filed. 

ENDS

* Special thanks to Swazi Media Commentary for this story

Communist Party of Swaziland calls for support for NAPSAWU

The Communist Party of Swaziland expresses its full solidarity with the National Public Servants and Allied Workers Union (NAPSAWU) in its landmark court victory and the battle for its full implementation, commencing this Friday 12 December, to upgrade the pay of hospital orderlies.

The case involves money squirreled away by the Mswati regime for its own use instead of being used as was stipulated to meet the pay requirements of about 1 000 hospital orderlies – some of the lowest paid public sector workers – for whom NAPSAWU had won a pay scale upgrade from A2 to A4.

This union had scored an important victory in improving the pay of hospital orderlies, from a paltry E2 500 to nearly E 6 000, a more civilised living wage (though only just). In addition, the workers were to receive a larger housing allowance of E601, up from E325 a month, plus an occupational health allowance because of exposure to infectious diseases at work.

The package also came with a deal that future recruitment of all non-academic and non-specialist jobs in the health service would be open to existing staff – a welcome concession that would see more varied positions, such as ambulance driving, being occupied by women.

The pay package was supposed to have been implemented from January this year. But the government reneged on the deal and has refused the pay scale upgrade. It now owes the workers millions in unpaid wages.

The wider context is a familiar and simple one. The toxically parasitic Mswati regime is continually squeezing cash from the state budget to sustain itself.

This is one of the main reasons why crucially important parts of the public sector – education, health, basic services – have been pared down until they are barely able to function. Charity and overseas aid is used to fill some of the gaps, but this is ineffectual, lopsided and not subject to any policy coherence.

In the area of health, this is also a main reason why Swaziland has the world’s worst rates of HIV and TB. Treatment is piecemeal, which is why many Swazis regularly flee to health clinics in South Africa to get ARVs and other drugs. Thousands of Swazis die every year needlessly, and solely because the Mswati regime refuses essential public spending. This is a crime of genocide pure and simple.

The regime has lost no time in attacking the NAPSAWU and trying to dislodge its President, Quinton Dlamini, including by threats to his family. Mswati is furious that the union is using his courts to try to reinstate the workers’ pay rise. His stance is part of his unrelenting efforts to crush or emasculate the trade union movement in Swaziland.

We therefore call for widespread solidarity with the NAPSAWU, and that unions and union federations everywhere closely monitor the situation. The regime is bound to come down heavily on the union and on the pickets planned to protest for better pay and conditions for health workers.

Long live NAPSAWU!

Justice for public sector health workers!

Long live working class solidarity!

Break the chains of oppression in Swaziland!

Contact

Kenneth Kunene

General Secretary

+27 72 594 3971

Remembering 9 - 10 December 2007; When University of Swaziland burned down

This week I recall 9 December 2007, the night when we, students of the University of Swaziland (UNISWA), scored a memorable victory over the historically all-powerful UNISWA Senate, the University Council and the government of Swaziland. At that time I was not a member of the Student Representative Council (SRC).

The day was a Sunday, but it was clearly not a normal Sunday. The whole week the weather had been unkindly hot but for some reason on this particular Sunday the drizzling rain decided to pay us a little visit.

By this time, we were collectively known as the ‘Choir.’ All students belonged to this ‘Choir.’ The 9^th of December is not a story about the day of 9 December per se. It is a story that shall always remain a point of reference and inspiration to many in so far as student activism is concerned. The broader mass democratic movement of Swaziland can also learn important things such as utmost commitment, and the importance of resolutely sticking together and forging ahead notwithstanding vicious attacks from the enemy in order to attain the desired goal. 9 December 2007 is therefore about a story of the people of Swaziland.

To bring everybody on board it is important to briefly trace the events that led to the all-important day of 9 December, 2007. When we came to register for the 2007/08 academic year in August 2007 we discovered that the university Senate had willy-nilly imposed a concept called ‘semesterization’ on all students, even to those on whom the semesterization concept was extraneous. The worst thing was that they had done it without consulting the students. The Senate had imported wholesale a concept they had seen working in other countries without bothering to analyse how those international universities were implementing that programme and thereby see the best way of implementing it in Swaziland. No consultation whatsoever was ever conducted.

For these reasons we started protesting against such tyranny. It was always believed that when the Senate had decided on an issue, no one could ever overturn it; all was decided and all was final, so said some of the cowards! But this breed of students was just about to rewrite the books of history. A court case was even launched with the High Court to force the Senate to consult us. Countless court journeys were made, but we were unsuccessful in a case presided over by Maphalala, J, who told us that we should go back and exhaust internal remedies. We strongly disagreed with the judge. It was a wrong decision. By the time judgment was passed the university premises were already controlled by the police. Riot police with big bullet-proof tankers had already set up camp with an order to violently deal with the students if the need arose.

Despite disagreeing with the Judge’s decision, we nevertheless respected it because of his statement that we must sit down with the Senate and resolve this issue. At this stage we had managed to mobilise the majority of students to such an extent that no classes took place when we had a students’ meeting or protest action. Such unity had never been seen probably since the early 1990s.

We were shocked by the narcissistic and egocentric Senate’s egregious decision to continue with the implementation of the programme despite the court’s order for the reconstitution of the consultation table. This move enraged us. We instantaneously resolved to continue with class boycotts, and that we were not going to write examination unless proper consultation took place. I remember very well that even the signing of continuous assessment marks became the most evil thing to be done by any student. Signing them simply meant that you were finally giving in to the Senate’s dictatorship, thereby a traitor.

The Senate tried the old divide-and-rule tactic of shutting down the university and sending all students home, but it always failed this time. We always planned ahead for such eventualities and were able to mobilise students even when the university was shut down.

A few days before the 9^th of December we made a court application for an urgent interdict staying the illegal examinations which had been scheduled to commence on the 10^th of December. However, Justice Mbutfo Mamba dismissed our case. The decision was delivered without reasons on the 9^th of December 2007. We were not satisfied with this judgment too. In fact we were furious!  

We therefore resolved to have a ‘night vigil’ in one of the small classes. It was in this vigil that we resolved that there only people who would stop the exams was not the Senate, not the courts, not prayer, but the students themselves. It was clear to us all that unless we did something ourselves our future was doomed. Everybody started running outside and in about an hour the whole University was on fire.

In the morning of December 10, we made it impossible for first examination papers to take place. We stomped the gate and ensured that no one went in or out. The Senate later yielded to our demands and the December examinations were postponed indefinitely. We had won against the so-called mighty Senate of the University of Swaziland.

One of the most important lessons of December 9, a night which some of the students later called ‘A bright Sunday Night’, is that unity in action will always prevail over anything. Unity of boardrooms and useless meetings never works! This is why all the students who sacrificed everything they had in order to see semesterization dead will always have a special place in my heart.

Of course, after the burning down of the university many people suddenly woke up from wherever they had been sleeping and called the students many bad names anybody can think of. Times of Swaziland’s Managing Editor, Martin Dlamini, who happens to be King Mswati’s speech writer, even referred to us as barbarians, hooligans and bandits. This was so foolish for a respected man who had been silent all the time when the Senate was roughshodly imposing an academic system on the students, but only to wake up after the consequences. I could tell from the reading of his article that he was not thinking. If he was thinking then he was not thinking properly. Blaming a child for crying will not stop her or him from crying if you do not stop the violent adult who keeps assaulting her or him. 

Conclusion

As the UNISWA students of 2007 proved to all, there is no struggle that can ever be won by following the rules of the enemy. Some rules are so unjust that we must necessarily violate them. The Senate closed down the university every time we boycotted classes, hoping to dampen our spirits, but every time when we returned we continued with the struggle more fiercely than before. We went to the point of defying all court decisions, something which still needs to be assimilated into the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) in the fight against the royal dictatorship of Swaziland!  

Back then we were united, but this unity did not fall from the sky. We had to build it. The struggle would not have been won if a tiny but resolute minority of students had not done serious mobilisation and conscientisation on a daily basis. I am proud to have been part of such group. In this group we met before and after any student body meeting in order to thoroughly analyse meetings and direction. Amazingly, none of us were even SRC members, but we were more influential than the SRC of that time. No students’ resolution was ever adopted without our endorsing it, and no students’ resolution was ever adopted without our giving input. We were effectively the unelected leadership of the whole university. This is one of the important factors that the Swaziland struggle lacks; the influential unelected leadership of the people! 

ANC Conflicted on Swaziland: Can it be trusted?

It is unfortunate, very unfortunate, that whenever we talk about Swaziland’s royal regime and its brutality on the people, particularly on the economic sphere, we must necessarily be forced to include the African National Congress (ANC) in that same hot pot. Sadly, some of our comrades, for whatever reason we are not aware of, always try to shut us down when it comes to this matter, when the fact of the matter is clear to us all that the ANC, wittingly or unwittingly, supports the regime, just like other imperialist forces. We can try to refute anyhow we want, but the ANC’s position in Swaziland is seriously conflicted!

We love the ANC, we support it, but this does not mean that we must agree with everything it does. When it comes to the Swaziland struggle, we will not hesitate to speak! This is a struggle which directly affects us every second! Some of us would rather remain poor forever than to bend principles and condone the ANC-Tinkhundla business venture at the expense of the oppressed! 

It is encouraging, however, that the voices against such positioning of the ANC are growing. An example is the statement of the Communist Party of Swaziland (CPS), dated 5 December 2014. It is reproduced in full hereunder with great approval:

CPS urges strong solidarity with Maloma colliery workers

The Communist Party of Swaziland expresses its full solidarity with the striking miners and colliery workers at the Maloma coal mine, in the Lubombo region of our country and denounce any pressures for brusque call off of the strike without meeting of demands.

We call on all workers and trade unions in Swaziland, South Africa and beyond to support the miners’ claim for better pay and conditions.

The posturing by the Mswati regime’s police force is typical of the dictatorship’s treatment of workers and unions: intimidation and the threat of violence, if not actual violence.

The miners are organized under the Mining, Quarrying and Allied Workers Union (MQAWU), an affiliate to TUCOSWA, the union federation proscribed by the regime.

The Maloma mine is 75% owned by Chancellor House, the in-house investment firm of South Africa’s African National Congress.

The other 25% is owned by Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, a billion-rand consortium. It is supposedly held in trust by Mswati III for the Swazi nation but in reality is one of the absolute monarch’s private income channels. In Maloma mine, such channels are watched over by Mswati’s brothers, Phinda and Themba Dlamini as directors.

The CPS calls on Chancellor House, as the principal owner of the mine, to come out strongly against police intimidation of and heavy-handed tactics against the miners. The Maloma management must oppose Mswati’s unwise ratcheting up of tensions by deploying heavily armed officers.

Pressure must also be put on the Maloma to behave in a civilized manner toward the strikers and stop refusing strikers water, sanitation and medical treatment. Management must get back to the negotiating table and accept that the strikers have a strong case for better pay and conditions.

The miners are striking in defence of their claim for E425 pay increment and E800 housing allowance, plus better workplace conditions.

Claims that the miners are paid well above the minimum wage (they are paid less than their South African counterparts), of E600 a month for skilled workers are, in the view of the CPS, meaningless as the minimum wage is itself a poverty wage and in insult to any employee.

The strikers are challenging an interdict imposed by management to prohibit picketing outside the workplace – a basic trade union right during industrial action. Instead pickets have been made to congregate some distance from the entrance to the mine.

Chancellor House and Tibiyo Taka Ngwane have a previous bad record of behaviour towards the miners and the local community, having earlier this year resisted beneficiation claims to improve conditions in the surrounding community.

The CPS is appalled that a company that abides by basic trade union and community rights in its home country is happy to disregard them in another for profit and simply because it can get away with it.

The CPS urges the WFTU and trade unionists and left parties to closely monitor the Maloma strike and to highlight the plight of workers at the colliery.

Amandla!

Contact

Kenneth Kunene

General Secretary

072 594 3971

Felix Mabaso

International Organiser

074 922 8277