Yesterday 22 July 2020 was Sobhuza II’s birthday, a public holiday in Swaziland.
Many tinkhundla propagandists, as usual, did all they could to force-feed the
public with the usual propaganda that Sobhuza was a hero of the people, and
that the people of Swaziland should be grateful to him for Swaziland’s independence
in 1968. Some went on to claim that he remains one of the most prominent African
anti-colonial heroes, counting him along the likes of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius
Nyerere and others.
Perhaps it is prudent that we consider more views on Sobhuza and his
legacy.
I thus suggest that we try and see how Sobhuza appears from the viewpoint
of Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini, a postdoctoral fellow in the International Studies
Group at the University of the Free State, South Africa. In 2019 she published a book titled “A
Constitutional History of the Kingdom of Eswatini (Swaziland), 1960–1982”. This
book followed her 2016 PHD Thesis titled, “Constitutional Developments in the Kingdom
of Swaziland 1960-2005.”
At first, it may be discouraging to read on Sobhuza from someone seen to
be hailing from the royal family, but I think we should undertake this risk. Hlengiwe
Portia Dlamini is a daughter of Prince Majawonke Dlamini.
Below I reproduce some of the excerpts drawn from her book, focusing
specifically on Swaziland’s decolonisation journey in the 1960s, with Sobhuza
being one of the main players at the time. The excerpts focus more on the
constitutional debates that were taking place in Swaziland from 1960 to 1963. From
the brief below, it is quite easy for the reader to know and understand, with
much better clarity, the type of person that Sobhuza was – at least from the lenses
of the author Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini.
While the findings are lifted largely from her 2019 book, I have been
forced to also add those from her 2016 PHD thesis. This is because it appears that
some of the findings in the thesis were either not included in the book or were
summarised, necessitating that I also add some of the excerpts from her thesis.
To that end, I have made an indication in that regard by adding “THESIS” in
brackets at the end of each particular paragraph – that is, where the statement
is drawn from the 2016 thesis. Where I have not made an indication as to the source
of the statement, the reader must assume that it comes from the 2019 book.
NB: I have not added any of my opinions in the excerpts below. The reader
is also strongly encouraged to read directly from the original – the book and
the PHD thesis – and get the full picture, and thus make their own conclusions.
Excerpts from the author Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini appear below
1.
The Swazi political platform was clearly divided
between the Moderates and the Progressives. The political debates were narrowed
between these two camps, and they reflected their different orientations. Whites
and the Swazi monarch claimed to be Moderate political leaders, as opposed to
Progressive.
2.
The Whites (European Advisory Council – EAC) and
King SobhuzaII’s SNC (Swazi National Council) argued that the political economy
of the colonial state should not be radically transformed through the adoption
of nationalization of private property as it would discourage investors and
negatively impact on the economic growth of Swaziland.
3.
Essentially the tension between the EAC and SNC,
on the one hand, and the Progressives, on the other hand, was clear.
4.
There were the Progressives, dubbed as radicals,
who formed political parties to champion their cause. They were the typical
African nationalists of the radical Nkrumah school who clamoured for immediate independence
and ‘Africa for Africans’.
5.
King Sobhuza II found support from Carl F. Todd,
the leader of the EAC, who was a wealthy South African businessman who had
settled in Swaziland. The Swazi monarch and the White community, therefore, constituted
the conservative camp, who were disturbed and frightened by the African
nationalist ideology of the nascent Swazi political parties.
6.
[Apartheid] South Africa had an eye on two groups
in Swaziland as possible bridges to be used to achieve its incorporation dream:
the Swazi monarchy and Whites that had taken up residence in Swaziland. Verwoerd’s
Bantustan project envisaged Swaziland as part of the unfolding South African political
system because of its structured traditional political system with King Sobhuza
II at the apex.
7.
Verwoerd enticed Swaziland to enter the Union by
promising to increase the powers of the Swazi monarch as a fully sovereign
leader.
8.
South Africa had become increasingly distressed by
rising nationalism in Swaziland and elsewhere, which it labelled as subversion and
which constituted a challenge to the principles of apartheid: universal adult suffrage
and black majority rule, which was the platform of the Swazi Progressives, was
anathema to the apartheid regime. South Africa was also opposed to pan Africanism
of the Nkrumah brand in Swaziland, owing to the numerical inferiority of the White
population in Africa and the threat such an ideology posed to the apartheid
system.
9.
In a reactionary speech delivered in May 1959, Sobhuza
condemned radical nationalists for challenging colonial rule and for adopting
alien political methods of contestation. (THESIS)
10. The
economic prosperity of Whites was also dependent on exploiting Black labour. The
relationship between the Whites and indigenous Swazis during the colonial
period was, essentially, one of masters and servants. White investors in
Swaziland were worried about nationalist propaganda that pointed to the
exploitation of Black labour.
11. King
Sobhuza II was against the emergent labour unions in Swaziland, which was part of
the expansion of the rights of association in the territory.
12. South
Africa did not want to see developments in Swaziland that would contradict the
White supremacist philosophy of the apartheid regime – particularly the concept
of universal suffrage allowing for one-man-one-vote, or Black majority rule
when the Black majority in South Africa were politically neutralized by the apartheid
system. Apartheid South Africa was therefore determined to use both the White
Swazis and the monarchy as proxies in achieving its goals.
13. A
prominent South African Nationalist Party lawyer Van Wyk de Vries assisted King
Sobhuza and the EAC to draw up apartheid-like constitutional proposals in anticipation
of constitutional reforms. These proposals, which Sobhuza presented in April 1960
in a speech calling for a Legislative Council for Swaziland, were tailored to
marginalise and eclipse the radical nationalists operating under the banner of
political parties, who were seen as K. Nkrumah’s disciples and as a threat to
both the White economic interests and the survival of the Swazi monarchy. The proposals
were clearly designed to protect the White minority and to insulate the
traditional monarchy, which was favourable to the racist regime, from any
dangers. (THESIS)
14. Before
the British Colonial Office authorised the commencement of constitutional talks
in Swaziland, the conservative monarchy and the reactionary White minority had
already crafted constitutional proposals with the technical assistance of
apartheid South Africa. (THESIS)
15. The
Ngwenyama’s constitutional stance was the handiwork of the apartheid
regime and he was, therefore, acting as a proxy. (THESIS)
16. The
White settlers and multinational corporations in Swaziland, concerned for the
vulnerability of their investments and private property in the event of a
leftist take over from the British, found a natural ally in King Sobhuza II,
who was out to conserve the traditional status quo and protect private
property.
17. According
to Sobhuza, Swazis needed the White settlers for the economic development of
the territory and, therefore, their properties must be protected and not
nationalized.
18. Without
identifying the radical Swazi nationalists by name, Sobhuza stated that those
who were advocating the nationalization of private property were ‘victims of bad
upbringing… they had been brutally and badly brought up and were now acting to their
early treatment [sic]’. He stated that Africans must co-exist with White
immigrants, because Swaziland was also their country and it was wrong to target
the confiscation of their property.
19. Sobhuza
submitted that the Africans did not understand what Europeans meant by
democracy.
20. Sobhuza’s
political ideology on the separation and federation of races smacked of disguised
apartheid. His constitutional proposal presented Africans as devoid of the
capacity to master Western democracy because he felt it was alien and too
complicated for them to comprehend.
21. Sobhuza
was against the idea of one-man-one-vote because it could potentially threaten the
traditional monarch, as had already happened elsewhere in Africa in the last
years of colonial rule and would certainly submerge the White minority in the
territory.
22. Sobhuza
argued that the policy of ‘one-man-one-vote’ was fatal for Africa because the
majority race would swallow the minority and do away with their rights and nationalize
their institutions. (THESIS)
23. Sobhuza’s
political ideology was disguised apartheid, at it hinged on the separation and
federation of races and pointed to the hand of South Africa in the formulation
of such a constitutional proposal. (THESIS)
24. In
essence, Sobhuza was advocating political hybridity by selecting elements from
Swazi culture and tradition that favoured him, and integrating them into a
modern political frame while rejecting liberal democracy as presented by the
British and advocated by the Progressives, which were a threat to him.
25. Sobhuza’s
political stance expectedly found sympathy with the White minorities and
multinational business interests, who were antinationalization.
26. On
voting members into the Legislature: The White minority, who were the economic
backbone of the territory, would be eclipsed in the event of the introduction of
universal suffrage. Given the performance of the educated elite elsewhere in Africa
at the polls, with the radical Nkrumah who was swept to power in elections in
Ghana in 1950 as a classic example, the Swazi monarchy was not comfortable with
the idea of elections organised on the basis of one man one vote. (THESIS)
27. The
White community was more comfortable with the question of land and mineral
rights being excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council and left
in Sobhuza’s hands, because they could more easily manipulate Sobhuza than a
Legislative Council the composition of which they could not trust.
28. The
White minority supported King Sobhuza II, although they were not necessarily traditionalists
or admirers of African political traditionalism. They preferred to support the Swazi
monarch, to have King Sobhuza’s powers intact and undiluted, because they trusted
he would defend their economic interests against the rising radical
nationalists who were threatening them with nationalization. This SNC–EAC
alliance had the backing King Sobhuza enjoyed from White multinational
investors and apartheid South Africa.
29. Public
opinion gauged from newspaper reports pointed to the fact that the 50–50 political
formula that was intended to give the country’s minority Whites an equal voice with
the Black majority in the Legislative Council was ridiculous, and would be
difficult for Britain to endorse because it was far off the mark of democratic
principles. This 50–50 proposal was viewed by a growing number of politically
conscious Swazis, Progressives, and White liberals as nothing more than a
device to perpetuate the privileges of the White business class, who were
essentially South African immigrants. This arrangement allowed Whites to exist as
a separate community from Blacks, and this state of affairs hindered racial
integration.
30. Indigenous
Swazis were overwhelmingly opposed to the draft constitution (50-50
constitutional proposal) contrary to what Sobhuza was purporting and that was
clear to the British colonial administration. (THESIS)
31. Carl
Todd (Sobhuza’s White ally) warned that the future of the White minority would be
in jeopardy if they endorsed the type of constitution the Progressives and White
liberals were demanding. Todd indicated that Whites needed to support and
strengthen the position of the Ngwenyama…
32. Carl
Todd was full of praises for the Ngwenyama when he stated: “Ngwenyama
is such a wise friend of the Europeans that we [the EAC] should support and
strengthen his position and not undermine it, and it is politically wise to
collaborate with the friends we know and trust…
33. ToddconcludedbycallingonthepublictosupporttheSNC–EACconstitutional
proposal and to resist being influenced by ‘political agitators’ – a term he
used to describe the Progressives. He assured Europeans that the constitution
would protect their stakes in the territory.
34. Sobhuza
also struggled to campaign for the acceptance of the 50–50 principle among Swazis
to no avail. In February 1962, he convened a popular meeting of Swazi men at
Lobamba and addressed them on the Committee’s proposals: they overwhelmingly
rejected the proposal.
35. The
Swazi National Council decided to hold another meeting in April but it broke up
in confusion as the Progressives and the monarchists clashed on almost every point,
particularly over the issue of equality between Whites and Swazis in the envisaged
legislature.
36. The
Swazi populace had been generally very critical of Sobhuza’s proposal of a racial
federation with the equality of indigenous Swazis and a handful of Whites in
the legislature. A free and fair referendum on the SNC/EAC constitutional proposal
did not stand a chance of being adopted and Sobhuza could not, therefore, envisage
such a political risk. (THESIS)
37. The
anti-50–50 sentiments were so pervasive that King Sobhuza started flip-flopping
over the issue.
38. Sobhuza
convened another meeting at a local inkhundla (meeting place) at Mbabane
at which the crowd was hostile to the 50–50 idea even before it had been
raised.
39. On
3 July 1962, he called another meeting of all adult Swazis at Lobamba to
discuss the constitutional proposal. Swazis turned out in large numbers and
this seems to have had an intimidating effect. The King and the SNC addressed
the people on several issues, avoiding touching on the constitutional proposal
because they were suspicious of the reaction of the crowd, who had come under
the sway of the Progressives. The monarch preferred to interrogate the leaders
of the Progressives privately, who were summoned to appear before the executive
council of the SNC: the liqoqo.
40. King
Sobhuza resorted to threats and denounced all those who embraced the ideas of political
parties, which he had denounced as ‘unSwazi’. Several similar meetings
continued in August without achieving anything, until people soon got tired and
stopped attending the meetings. The Swazi population was clearly not in favour
of the constitutional proposal, which favoured the White minority outright by giving
them representation equal to that of the Swazi majority. The 50–50 issue united
the Swazis against their king.
41. Essentially,
before the London constitutional talks on Swaziland, there were cracks within the
ranks of the SNC group, as some members felt Sobhuza was not prepared to listen
to the voice of the Swazis.
42. In
London discussions: The EAC delegates (Sobhuza’s ally) expressed their wish to
see the incorporation of Swaziland into or, at least, for it to be part of, a
federal arrangement with South Africa. They felt that this could be better
achieved with the assistance of the Nationalist Party in power. Sobhuza’s SNC
supported their ally and calculated that they could successfully stem the rise
of radical African nationalism by accepting a Bantustan status within the
protective shield of South Africa.
43. Meanwhile,
the British government and the Progressives wanted mineral rights to be vested
in the Legislative Council and not in the monarch, while the SNC–EAC alliance wanted
Sobhuza to be in control.
44. The
radical political leaders countered the constitutional stance of the SNC–EAC and
were either fired or forced to resign from the Constitutional Committee.
45. In
essence, Sobhuza, with the support of the Whites, wanted to enter modern politics
with the traditional structures of the Swazi kingdom intact under Sobhuza II
and with separate privileges for Whites. This political stance smacked of
historical anachronism and disguised apartheid. White interest groups and apartheid
South Africa persuaded King Sobhuza to form a political party because they preferred
him to the Progressive political leaders, and because staying out of modern politics
would result in the monarch being eclipsed.
46. Prominent
South African Afrikaner politicians such as the Broderbond member Van Wyk de
Vries and MP, and later Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster also advised King Sobhuza
to form a political party to contest the June 1964 elections, in order to
remain relevant in Swazi politics.
47. South
Africa provided King Sobhuza with financial and organizational resources for the
formation of his own political party to challenge the radical nationalists.
