A JOURNEY TO THE REAL SOBHUZA II THE DICTATOR OF SWAZILAND

Yesterday 22 July 2020 was Sobhuza II’s birthday, a public holiday in Swaziland. Many tinkhundla propagandists, as usual, did all they could to force-feed the public with the usual propaganda that Sobhuza was a hero of the people, and that the people of Swaziland should be grateful to him for Swaziland’s independence in 1968. Some went on to claim that he remains one of the most prominent African anti-colonial heroes, counting him along the likes of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and others.

Perhaps it is prudent that we consider more views on Sobhuza and his legacy.

I thus suggest that we try and see how Sobhuza appears from the viewpoint of Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini, a postdoctoral fellow in the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, South Africa.  In 2019 she published a book titled “A Constitutional History of the Kingdom of Eswatini (Swaziland), 1960–1982”. This book followed her 2016 PHD Thesis titled, “Constitutional Developments in the Kingdom of Swaziland 1960-2005.”

At first, it may be discouraging to read on Sobhuza from someone seen to be hailing from the royal family, but I think we should undertake this risk. Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini is a daughter of Prince Majawonke Dlamini.

Below I reproduce some of the excerpts drawn from her book, focusing specifically on Swaziland’s decolonisation journey in the 1960s, with Sobhuza being one of the main players at the time. The excerpts focus more on the constitutional debates that were taking place in Swaziland from 1960 to 1963. From the brief below, it is quite easy for the reader to know and understand, with much better clarity, the type of person that Sobhuza was – at least from the lenses of the author Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini.

While the findings are lifted largely from her 2019 book, I have been forced to also add those from her 2016 PHD thesis. This is because it appears that some of the findings in the thesis were either not included in the book or were summarised, necessitating that I also add some of the excerpts from her thesis. To that end, I have made an indication in that regard by adding “THESIS” in brackets at the end of each particular paragraph – that is, where the statement is drawn from the 2016 thesis. Where I have not made an indication as to the source of the statement, the reader must assume that it comes from the 2019 book.

NB: I have not added any of my opinions in the excerpts below. The reader is also strongly encouraged to read directly from the original – the book and the PHD thesis – and get the full picture, and thus make their own conclusions.

Excerpts from the author Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini appear below

1.    The Swazi political platform was clearly divided between the Moderates and the Progressives. The political debates were narrowed between these two camps, and they reflected their different orientations. Whites and the Swazi monarch claimed to be Moderate political leaders, as opposed to Progressive.

2.    The Whites (European Advisory Council – EAC) and King SobhuzaII’s SNC (Swazi National Council) argued that the political economy of the colonial state should not be radically transformed through the adoption of nationalization of private property as it would discourage investors and negatively impact on the economic growth of Swaziland.

3.    Essentially the tension between the EAC and SNC, on the one hand, and the Progressives, on the other hand, was clear.

4.    There were the Progressives, dubbed as radicals, who formed political parties to champion their cause. They were the typical African nationalists of the radical Nkrumah school who clamoured for immediate independence and ‘Africa for Africans’.

5.    King Sobhuza II found support from Carl F. Todd, the leader of the EAC, who was a wealthy South African businessman who had settled in Swaziland. The Swazi monarch and the White community, therefore, constituted the conservative camp, who were disturbed and frightened by the African nationalist ideology of the nascent Swazi political parties.

6.    [Apartheid] South Africa had an eye on two groups in Swaziland as possible bridges to be used to achieve its incorporation dream: the Swazi monarchy and Whites that had taken up residence in Swaziland. Verwoerd’s Bantustan project envisaged Swaziland as part of the unfolding South African political system because of its structured traditional political system with King Sobhuza II at the apex.

7.    Verwoerd enticed Swaziland to enter the Union by promising to increase the powers of the Swazi monarch as a fully sovereign leader.

8.    South Africa had become increasingly distressed by rising nationalism in Swaziland and elsewhere, which it labelled as subversion and which constituted a challenge to the principles of apartheid: universal adult suffrage and black majority rule, which was the platform of the Swazi Progressives, was anathema to the apartheid regime. South Africa was also opposed to pan Africanism of the Nkrumah brand in Swaziland, owing to the numerical inferiority of the White population in Africa and the threat such an ideology posed to the apartheid system.

9.    In a reactionary speech delivered in May 1959, Sobhuza condemned radical nationalists for challenging colonial rule and for adopting alien political methods of contestation. (THESIS)

10. The economic prosperity of Whites was also dependent on exploiting Black labour. The relationship between the Whites and indigenous Swazis during the colonial period was, essentially, one of masters and servants. White investors in Swaziland were worried about nationalist propaganda that pointed to the exploitation of Black labour.

11. King Sobhuza II was against the emergent labour unions in Swaziland, which was part of the expansion of the rights of association in the territory.

12. South Africa did not want to see developments in Swaziland that would contradict the White supremacist philosophy of the apartheid regime – particularly the concept of universal suffrage allowing for one-man-one-vote, or Black majority rule when the Black majority in South Africa were politically neutralized by the apartheid system. Apartheid South Africa was therefore determined to use both the White Swazis and the monarchy as proxies in achieving its goals.

13. A prominent South African Nationalist Party lawyer Van Wyk de Vries assisted King Sobhuza and the EAC to draw up apartheid-like constitutional proposals in anticipation of constitutional reforms. These proposals, which Sobhuza presented in April 1960 in a speech calling for a Legislative Council for Swaziland, were tailored to marginalise and eclipse the radical nationalists operating under the banner of political parties, who were seen as K. Nkrumah’s disciples and as a threat to both the White economic interests and the survival of the Swazi monarchy. The proposals were clearly designed to protect the White minority and to insulate the traditional monarchy, which was favourable to the racist regime, from any dangers. (THESIS)

14. Before the British Colonial Office authorised the commencement of constitutional talks in Swaziland, the conservative monarchy and the reactionary White minority had already crafted constitutional proposals with the technical assistance of apartheid South Africa. (THESIS)

15. The Ngwenyama’s constitutional stance was the handiwork of the apartheid regime and he was, therefore, acting as a proxy. (THESIS)

16. The White settlers and multinational corporations in Swaziland, concerned for the vulnerability of their investments and private property in the event of a leftist take over from the British, found a natural ally in King Sobhuza II, who was out to conserve the traditional status quo and protect private property.

17. According to Sobhuza, Swazis needed the White settlers for the economic development of the territory and, therefore, their properties must be protected and not nationalized.

18. Without identifying the radical Swazi nationalists by name, Sobhuza stated that those who were advocating the nationalization of private property were ‘victims of bad upbringing… they had been brutally and badly brought up and were now acting to their early treatment [sic]’. He stated that Africans must co-exist with White immigrants, because Swaziland was also their country and it was wrong to target the confiscation of their property.

19. Sobhuza submitted that the Africans did not understand what Europeans meant by democracy.

20. Sobhuza’s political ideology on the separation and federation of races smacked of disguised apartheid. His constitutional proposal presented Africans as devoid of the capacity to master Western democracy because he felt it was alien and too complicated for them to comprehend.

21. Sobhuza was against the idea of one-man-one-vote because it could potentially threaten the traditional monarch, as had already happened elsewhere in Africa in the last years of colonial rule and would certainly submerge the White minority in the territory.

22. Sobhuza argued that the policy of ‘one-man-one-vote’ was fatal for Africa because the majority race would swallow the minority and do away with their rights and nationalize their institutions. (THESIS)

23. Sobhuza’s political ideology was disguised apartheid, at it hinged on the separation and federation of races and pointed to the hand of South Africa in the formulation of such a constitutional proposal. (THESIS)

24. In essence, Sobhuza was advocating political hybridity by selecting elements from Swazi culture and tradition that favoured him, and integrating them into a modern political frame while rejecting liberal democracy as presented by the British and advocated by the Progressives, which were a threat to him. 

25. Sobhuza’s political stance expectedly found sympathy with the White minorities and multinational business interests, who were antinationalization.

26. On voting members into the Legislature: The White minority, who were the economic backbone of the territory, would be eclipsed in the event of the introduction of universal suffrage. Given the performance of the educated elite elsewhere in Africa at the polls, with the radical Nkrumah who was swept to power in elections in Ghana in 1950 as a classic example, the Swazi monarchy was not comfortable with the idea of elections organised on the basis of one man one vote. (THESIS)

27. The White community was more comfortable with the question of land and mineral rights being excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council and left in Sobhuza’s hands, because they could more easily manipulate Sobhuza than a Legislative Council the composition of which they could not trust.

28. The White minority supported King Sobhuza II, although they were not necessarily traditionalists or admirers of African political traditionalism. They preferred to support the Swazi monarch, to have King Sobhuza’s powers intact and undiluted, because they trusted he would defend their economic interests against the rising radical nationalists who were threatening them with nationalization. This SNC–EAC alliance had the backing King Sobhuza enjoyed from White multinational investors and apartheid South Africa.

29. Public opinion gauged from newspaper reports pointed to the fact that the 50–50 political formula that was intended to give the country’s minority Whites an equal voice with the Black majority in the Legislative Council was ridiculous, and would be difficult for Britain to endorse because it was far off the mark of democratic principles. This 50–50 proposal was viewed by a growing number of politically conscious Swazis, Progressives, and White liberals as nothing more than a device to perpetuate the privileges of the White business class, who were essentially South African immigrants. This arrangement allowed Whites to exist as a separate community from Blacks, and this state of affairs hindered racial integration.

30. Indigenous Swazis were overwhelmingly opposed to the draft constitution (50-50 constitutional proposal) contrary to what Sobhuza was purporting and that was clear to the British colonial administration. (THESIS)

31. Carl Todd (Sobhuza’s White ally) warned that the future of the White minority would be in jeopardy if they endorsed the type of constitution the Progressives and White liberals were demanding. Todd indicated that Whites needed to support and strengthen the position of the Ngwenyama…

32. Carl Todd was full of praises for the Ngwenyama when he stated: “Ngwenyama is such a wise friend of the Europeans that we [the EAC] should support and strengthen his position and not undermine it, and it is politically wise to collaborate with the friends we know and trust…

33. ToddconcludedbycallingonthepublictosupporttheSNC–EACconstitutional proposal and to resist being influenced by ‘political agitators’ – a term he used to describe the Progressives. He assured Europeans that the constitution would protect their stakes in the territory.

34. Sobhuza also struggled to campaign for the acceptance of the 50–50 principle among Swazis to no avail. In February 1962, he convened a popular meeting of Swazi men at Lobamba and addressed them on the Committee’s proposals: they overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.

35. The Swazi National Council decided to hold another meeting in April but it broke up in confusion as the Progressives and the monarchists clashed on almost every point, particularly over the issue of equality between Whites and Swazis in the envisaged legislature.

36. The Swazi populace had been generally very critical of Sobhuza’s proposal of a racial federation with the equality of indigenous Swazis and a handful of Whites in the legislature. A free and fair referendum on the SNC/EAC constitutional proposal did not stand a chance of being adopted and Sobhuza could not, therefore, envisage such a political risk. (THESIS)

37. The anti-50–50 sentiments were so pervasive that King Sobhuza started flip-flopping over the issue.

38. Sobhuza convened another meeting at a local inkhundla (meeting place) at Mbabane at which the crowd was hostile to the 50–50 idea even before it had been raised.

39. On 3 July 1962, he called another meeting of all adult Swazis at Lobamba to discuss the constitutional proposal. Swazis turned out in large numbers and this seems to have had an intimidating effect. The King and the SNC addressed the people on several issues, avoiding touching on the constitutional proposal because they were suspicious of the reaction of the crowd, who had come under the sway of the Progressives. The monarch preferred to interrogate the leaders of the Progressives privately, who were summoned to appear before the executive council of the SNC: the liqoqo.

40. King Sobhuza resorted to threats and denounced all those who embraced the ideas of political parties, which he had denounced as ‘unSwazi’. Several similar meetings continued in August without achieving anything, until people soon got tired and stopped attending the meetings. The Swazi population was clearly not in favour of the constitutional proposal, which favoured the White minority outright by giving them representation equal to that of the Swazi majority. The 50–50 issue united the Swazis against their king.

41. Essentially, before the London constitutional talks on Swaziland, there were cracks within the ranks of the SNC group, as some members felt Sobhuza was not prepared to listen to the voice of the Swazis.

42. In London discussions: The EAC delegates (Sobhuza’s ally) expressed their wish to see the incorporation of Swaziland into or, at least, for it to be part of, a federal arrangement with South Africa. They felt that this could be better achieved with the assistance of the Nationalist Party in power. Sobhuza’s SNC supported their ally and calculated that they could successfully stem the rise of radical African nationalism by accepting a Bantustan status within the protective shield of South Africa.

43. Meanwhile, the British government and the Progressives wanted mineral rights to be vested in the Legislative Council and not in the monarch, while the SNC–EAC alliance wanted Sobhuza to be in control.

44. The radical political leaders countered the constitutional stance of the SNC–EAC and were either fired or forced to resign from the Constitutional Committee.

45. In essence, Sobhuza, with the support of the Whites, wanted to enter modern politics with the traditional structures of the Swazi kingdom intact under Sobhuza II and with separate privileges for Whites. This political stance smacked of historical anachronism and disguised apartheid. White interest groups and apartheid South Africa persuaded King Sobhuza to form a political party because they preferred him to the Progressive political leaders, and because staying out of modern politics would result in the monarch being eclipsed.

46. Prominent South African Afrikaner politicians such as the Broderbond member Van Wyk de Vries and MP, and later Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster also advised King Sobhuza to form a political party to contest the June 1964 elections, in order to remain relevant in Swazi politics.

47. South Africa provided King Sobhuza with financial and organizational resources for the formation of his own political party to challenge the radical nationalists.